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ABSTRACT 
  Congress uses the income tax to achieve policy goals. States import 
federal tax policies into their own tax systems when they incorporate 
by reference the federal income tax base as the starting point for 
assessment of state income taxes. But federal tax policies reflect 
national, not state, political choices. This Article calls attention to the 
practice of tax-base conformity and to its advantages and 
disadvantages. Conformity conserves legislative, administrative, and 
judicial resources, and it reduces taxpayers’ compliance burdens. At 
the same time, however, conforming states cede tax autonomy to the 
federal government, thereby jeopardizing federalism values, such as 
regulatory diversity and diffusion of power. Conforming states also 
expose themselves to revenue volatility stemming from the ever-
changing federal tax law. Despite these concerns, the administrative 
and compliance advantages of federal-state tax-base conformity are so 
significant that states are unlikely to abandon it. Thus, this Article 
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makes only limited recommendations for reducing the adverse 
impacts of tax-base conformity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Congress uses tax incentives to regulate by rewarding socially 
useful behavior with lower taxes and penalizing undesirable activities 
with higher taxes. Deductions, exemptions, and tax credits reward 
favored activities, such as charitable giving. Higher tax rates, 
acceleration of tax liability, and denials of deductions, exemptions, 
and tax credits penalize disfavored activities, such as early withdrawal 
of retirement savings. Thus, Congress uses its taxing power to 
influence behavior. 
Whereas Congress uses tax incentives to affect the behavior of 
private taxpayers, this Article argues that federal tax incentives also 
affect the states because most states incorporate federal definitions of 
income into their own tax laws. For example, the starting point for 
calculating individual income taxes in almost all states is the 
taxpayer’s federal “adjusted gross income” or “taxable income.” As 
this Article explains, these federal income definitions reflect a variety 
of controversial tax policy decisions made at the federal level. When 
states incorporate by reference federal income definitions, states 
automatically import federal tax policies into state law. Although 
states set their own income tax rates, and although states deviate from 
federal tax law on some issues, all state income taxes closely track the 
federal tax base. 
The usual reason given for federal-state tax-base conformity is 
administrability. Assessing state income taxes upon the federal tax 
base eases states’ legislative and enforcement burdens, and it reduces 
taxpayers’ compliance burdens. This Article provides a fuller account 
of the benefits of tax-base conformity. For example, state conformity 
with the federal tax base results in states using the same tax bases as 
each other—that is, federal-state tax-base conformity results in de 
facto state tax-base harmonization. Among other advantages, state 
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tax-base harmonization facilitates interstate commerce by reducing 
transaction costs for taxpayers with economic activities in more than 
one state. Harmonization also reduces the risk to taxpayers of double 
state taxation, as well as the risk to states of tax-base erosion through 
tax arbitrage. Finally, state bases that conform with the federal base 
also likely contain fewer protectionist provisions or provisions that 
discriminate against residents of other states than would 
autonomously drafted state tax bases. 
Although it generates many advantages, federal-state tax-base 
conformity also presents disadvantages. For example, conforming 
states cede tax autonomy to the federal government, thereby 
potentially reducing states’ responsiveness to resident voters. 
Furthermore, conformity jeopardizes the values served by federalism, 
including regulatory diversity and diffusion of power. Finally, 
conforming states also expose themselves to the revenue volatility 
that stems from the ever-changing federal tax law. 
Despite these disadvantages, federal-state tax-base conformity so 
far has generated little controversy, perhaps because tax scholars tend 
to focus on federal taxation to the exclusion of state taxation.1 
Although tax scholars have considered the fiscal federalism 
implications of particular federal tax provisions that affect state 
taxation, such as the federal deduction for state and local taxation, 
federal-state tax-base conformity has not played a significant role in 
fiscal federalism analysis.2 One commentator, however, recently 
considered the democratic impact of federal-state tax-base 
 
 1. See Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407, 423 
(2010) (calling base conformity “little discussed”). The last scholarly article that had tax-base 
conformity as its principal topic was published in 1977. Otto G. Stolz & George A. Purdy, 
Federal Collection of State Individual Income Taxes, 1977 DUKE L.J. 59. Stolz and Purdy’s 
analysis is more limited than that provided in this Article because they focus on the now defunct 
Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6361–65 (1988) (repealed 1990), under 
which the federal government would collect income taxes on behalf of the states, provided that 
the states substantially conformed their bases with the federal base. Stolz & Purdy, supra, at 61–
66.  
 2. For articles discussing the federal deduction for state and local taxes, see generally, for 
example, Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, 
and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805 (2008); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and 
the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413 
(1996); Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975 (2011); and Kirk 
J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage 
State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389 (2004). 
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conformity.3 In an article primarily addressing international 
delegation, Professor Michael Dorf used the example of federal-state 
tax-base conformity to illustrate his argument that “upward 
delegation[]”4 within a federal system raises fewer democratic 
concerns than does upward delegation from a nation to a 
supranational institution.5 Though Professor Dorf is undoubtedly 
correct in this comparative analysis, at least three factors justify 
taking a closer look at federal-state tax-base conformity. First is the 
states’ growing reliance on income taxation in the face of declining 
property tax revenues.6 Second is Congress’s growing tendency to use 
the federal tax law to regulate, rather than simply to raise revenue.7 
Both of these factors tend to increase the regulatory impact in the 
states of federal-state tax-base conformity. Finally, the current 
divisive political environment may mean that national policy 
preferences are more likely to diverge from state policy preferences. 
After exploring the advantages and disadvantages of tax-base 
conformity, this Article argues that the most important tool for 
mitigating the adverse impact of federal-state tax-base conformity is 
states’ ability to deviate from the federal tax base. Because no law 
obliges states to conform to the federal tax base, states may terminate 
conformity at any time. Moreover, states can deviate or “decouple”8 
from particular federal tax provisions on a case-by-case basis, which 
 
 3. Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 153–
58 (2008).  
 4. Id. at 118. 
 5. Id. at 153–58. 
 6. See Kim Reuben & Carol Rosenberg, State and Local Revenues, 119 TAX NOTES 77, 78 
(2008) (noting that from the 1970s to 2008, state personal income taxes as a share of all state and 
local revenue, including local taxes, grew from 9 to 12 percent); see also TAX POLICY CTR., THE 
TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE FOR THE 2008 ELECTION AND BEYOND, at 
IV-1-4 (2008), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/upload/Statelocal/IV-
1STATEOFLOCALTAXPOLICY.final.pdf (providing detailed data and noting that state 
personal income tax collections totaled $305 billion in 2008).  
 7. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-690, TAX 
EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE 
REEXAMINED 22–27 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05690.pdf (showing an 
increase over time in the number and dollar value of federal tax expenditures). The most 
dramatic recent example of regulation through the tax law is the enforcement through a tax 
penalty of the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. See I.R.C. 
§ 5000A (Supp. V 2012) (imposing a tax penalty on certain individuals who fail to maintain 
minimum essential health-care coverage).  
 8. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 7.02[1][a] 
(3d ed. Supp. 2007) (discussing states’ decisions to deviate from or conform to federal bonus 
depreciation in 2001). 
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allows states to secure the principal advantages of base conformity 
while retaining significant control over their fiscal systems. This 
feature of tax-base conformity contrasts with other intergovernmental 
cooperative mechanisms, such as international delegations or 
conditional grants, which generally restrict deviations.9 
Notwithstanding the formal option to deviate, certain factors 
tend to entrench federal tax law within the states. State deviations 
from the federal tax base face political, procedural, and 
administrative obstacles. One political obstacle is that after states 
incorporate federal tax preferences into the state tax base, state 
taxpayers come to rely on them, making them harder to repeal. In 
particular, if state taxpayers view state deviations from federal tax 
preferences as “tax increases,” this framing would discourage 
deviations. In addition, deviations increase compliance and 
enforcement costs for states and taxpayers. Despite these costs and 
obstacles, all states have exercised their option to deviate (at least 
somewhat) from the federal tax base. 
But not all federal tax laws are created equal from the 
perspective of states wishing to deviate. As a practical matter, some 
federal tax provisions cannot easily be severed from the rest of the 
federal tax base. Examples of nonseverable federal provisions include 
the annual reporting requirement and the realization rule.10 It is not 
practical for conforming states to deviate from such federal 
provisions. Unfortunately, as this Article shows, because the degree 
of entrenchment of a federal tax provision is not necessarily related to 
its normative desirability, incorporating states will sometimes be 
unable to deviate from federal tax rules that do not work well for the 
state or that do not reflect the preferences of state voters.11 
The primary aims of this Article are positive; it analyzes the 
practice of tax-base conformity with emphasis on its advantages and 
disadvantages, and it seeks to explain why base conformity is both 
widespread and entrenched. The first five parts of the Article tackle 
these issues. Part I provides background on state conformity with the 
federal individual income tax base. Although I focus on individual 
taxation because of its revenue significance,12 many of my arguments 
 
 9. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 115–24.  
 10. For more on the realization rule, see infra Part III.A.1.  
 11. See infra Part V.C. 
 12. Excluding local taxes, in 2008, state individual income taxes accounted for 24 percent of 
total state tax revenues, whereas corporate taxes accounted for 4 percent. The remainder of 
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also apply to corporate taxes because many states also incorporate 
the federal corporate tax base.13 Part II analyzes the advantages of 
tax-base conformity. Part III analyzes its disadvantages. Part IV 
considers the impact of base conformity on state tax competition. Part 
V considers the extent to which states’ ability to decouple from 
particular provisions of the federal tax law mitigates the 
disadvantages of conformity, and it concludes that the entrenchment 
of certain federal tax provisions limits states’ opportunities for 
deviation. Although the primary purpose of this Article is to shed 
light on the hidden impact of tax-base conformity, rather than to 
make normative claims about conformity, Part VI nevertheless makes 
limited policy recommendations for reducing some of the adverse 
impacts of base conformity identified in Part III. Part VI also points 
to avenues for future research that would expressly take base 
conformity into account as an important aspect of both state tax 
policy and fiscal federalism. 
In making policy recommendations, Part VI assumes 
(realistically) that the administrative and other advantages of tax-base 
conformity are so substantial that states will not abandon conformity. 
Part VI therefore considers other steps states can take to mitigate the 
democracy and federalism concerns raised by conformity. For 
example, conforming states should publish tax expenditure budgets, 
which would alert voters and state officials to the costs of 
incorporating federal tax subsidies. Likewise, rather than conforming 
to the federal definition of “taxable income,” states instead should 
conform to the federal definition of “adjusted gross income.”14 
Making this simple change would prevent states from automatically 
incorporating federal itemized deductions that have clear regulatory 
goals. 
An implication of the analysis in this Article is that federal-state 
fiscal interactions are more complex than is usually appreciated, and 
specifically, that commentators have underestimated the influence of 
the federal government on state tax policy. For example, although 
many commentators (including myself) have commented on the 
 
state revenue was from other sources, such as sales and gross-receipts taxes and utility revenues. 
See TAX POLICY CTR., TAX FACTS: STATE AND LOCAL GENERAL REVENUE 2004–2010 (2012), 
available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=507. 
 13. For more on state conformity to the federal corporate tax base, see generally 
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶¶ 7.02–7.16 (Supp. 2007). 
 14. For a definition of “adjusted gross income,” see infra note 24 and accompanying text.  
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absence of an active federal role in state taxation,15 this Article reveals 
that the federal government wields substantial passive influence over 
state taxation by defining the tax base. 
Base conformity therefore should play a meaningful role in 
federalism analysis and tax policy debates.16 Part VI shows that 
explicit consideration of base conformity provides new insight into 
old tax policy questions. For example, it provides new justification for 
the federal deduction for state and local income taxes: the deduction 
encourages states to raise revenue via a method that indirectly 
bolsters federal policy. Base conformity considerations also reinforce 
the argument that the preferred form for federal tax incentives should 
be credits, rather than deductions or exemptions. Structuring federal 
tax incentives as credits not only would assure that low-bracket 
taxpayers receive the same benefits as high-bracket taxpayers, but it 
also would minimize the regulatory impact of federal tax incentives at 
the state level, given that the default under base conformity is that 
states do not incorporate federal credits. Part VI discusses the impact 
of base conformity on other important tax policies as well, including 
the use of legislative sunsets and the possibility of adopting a federal 
consumption tax. Finally, Part VI suggests specific avenues for 
empirical research that would afford us a better understanding of the 
role of base conformity in our fiscal federal system. 
I.  FEDERAL-STATE TAX-BASE CONFORMITY 
To understand the regulatory impact of the federal tax base on 
the states, it is important first to understand some technical aspects of 
state tax bases. Forty-one states have broad-based individual income 
taxes; two tax only unearned income, and seven states have no 
 
 15. See Walter Hellerstein, Georg W. Kofler & Ruth Mason, Constitutional Restraints on 
Corporate Tax Integration, 62 TAX L. REV. 1, 57–58 (2008) (“Although . . . Congress has 
occasionally imposed national rules affecting direct taxation . . . , states have largely been left to 
their own devices . . . .”); see also Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will 
Congress Intervene?, 23 J. LEGIS. 171, 182–203 (1997) (studying empirically congressional 
intervention in state taxation, but not considering conformity as a method of intervention); 
Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
895, 952–54 (1992) (providing reasons as to why members of Congress are reluctant to intervene 
directly to limit state taxing powers, even if doing so would increase efficiency). 
 16. This is currently not the case. For example, in a lengthy recent article, Professor David 
Super only briefly considered tax-base conformity. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal 
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2594–98 (2005). 
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individual income taxes at all.17 The nine states without 
comprehensive income taxes are not the principal subject of this 
Article. But they demonstrate that it is possible for at least some 
states to fund their public programs without reliance on income 
taxation.18 As discussed in Part V.A., that some states have forgone 
comprehensive income taxation shows that at least some states have a 
viable alternative to federal-state tax-base conformity.19 This Part 
focuses on the forty-one states with comprehensive income taxes, and 
it describes how these states rely significantly on the federal tax base 
for purposes of determining their residents’ income tax liability. 
States conform their tax bases with that of the federal 
government in a variety of ways. In the past, for example, some states 
simply collected a fixed percentage of each resident’s federal tax 
liability.20 This method represented perfect state conformity with the 
federal base as well as its progressive rate structure. Today no state 
directly piggybacks on the federal tax; that is, no state calculates its 
income tax as a simple percentage of federal tax liability.21 
Instead, states conform to the federal tax base by incorporating 
federal definitions of income into their own law. Thirty-five of the 
forty-one states with broad-based income taxes use federal definitions 
of income as the starting point for calculating residents’ taxable 
income.22 Twenty-nine states start with federal “adjusted gross 
income” (AGI).23 Federal AGI is federal gross income after so-called 
above-the-line deductions for such items as contributions to self-
employed retirement plans, alimony payments, individual retirement 
account (IRA) contributions, moving expenses, and certain 
 
 17. See RICK OLIN & SANDY SWAIN, WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, 
INFORMATIONAL PAPER 4, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX PROVISIONS IN THE STATES 1–2 (2011), 
available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/Informational-Papers/Documents/2011/
4_individual%20income%20tax%20provisions%20in%20the%20states.pdf.  
 18. Seven states—Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and 
Wyoming—do not tax income at all, and another two states—New Hampshire and Tennessee—
tax only unearned income. Id. Although the two states that tax only unearned income rely on 
federal tax laws, they do so to a much lesser extent than do states with comprehensive income 
taxes. See generally id. at 14–57 (providing an overview of each state’s income tax provisions). 
 19.  See infra Part V.A.  
 20. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 (Supp. 2003).  
 21. Id. 
 22. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14–57.  
 23. Id.  
MASON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2013  6:54 PM 
1276 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1267 
educational expenses, such as payments of student-loan interest.24 In 
contrast with the majority of states that start with federal AGI, six 
states use as their starting point federal “taxable income,” which is 
federal AGI less personal exemptions and either the standard 
deduction or itemized deductions.25 Because states that begin their 
income calculations with federal taxable income automatically 
incorporate federal itemized deductions into their tax bases, they 
generally will conform more closely to the federal tax base than states 
using federal AGI as their starting point. Nevertheless, most states 
that use federal AGI as their starting point still permit taxpayers to 
take personal exemptions and to elect either a standard deduction or 
itemized deductions.26 Most states, including those that use federal 
AGI as their starting point, at least partially conform their itemized 
deductions to the federal itemized deductions.27 
States adopt federal definitions of income in either a static or 
dynamic fashion. States with static, or “fixed-date,” incorporation 
adopt the federal tax base as it existed at a certain point in time,28 
whereas states with dynamic, or “rolling,” incorporation use current 
federal tax law as the starting point for their determinations of 
 
 24. For a simple explanation of above-the-line deductions, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
PUB. 17, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX: FOR INDIVIDUALS 123–42 (2011), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf.  
 25. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14–57. 
 26. See id. at 5 (noting that thirty-four states had standard deductions in 2009). 
 27. Many states offer itemized deductions identical to the federal itemized deductions. See 
id. at 11 tbl.4 (detailing each state’s degree of conformity with federal itemized deductions). 
Only eleven states with broad-based income taxes did not conform at least partially with federal 
itemized deductions. Of these eleven, ten did not have to specify autonomously the content of 
state itemized deductions because they completely disallowed itemized deductions. Id.  
 28. For example, South Carolina incorporates federal tax law statically. See S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 12-6-40(A)(1)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2012) (“Except as otherwise provided, ‘Internal 
Revenue Code’ means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended through December 31, 
2011, and includes the effective date provisions contained in it.”). 
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taxable income.29 Fewer than half the states with income taxes 
incorporate federal law dynamically.30 
Although states begin their income calculations with either 
federal AGI or federal taxable income, all states deviate, or decouple, 
from particular provisions of the federal tax law. For example, states 
typically require residents to add back the federal-level deduction for 
the payment of state and local income taxes.31 Likewise, although the 
federal government allows taxpayers to exempt interest from all state 
and local bonds, most states require residents to add back interest 
earned on out-of-state bonds.32 
In addition to making upward adjustments to residents’ income, 
many states also provide deductions that are unavailable at the 
federal level. For example, several states allow residents to deduct 
their federal taxes.33 Other common state adjustments include 
allowing state residents to subtract federally taxable Social Security 
benefits and retirement or pension income.34 States use such special 
tax provisions to attract residents and to advance other policy goals 
and preferences. For example, in a provision that presumably aims to 
promote Mississippi casinos, Mississippi provides a special itemized 
deduction for gambling losses, but it limits the deduction to losses 
incurred at Mississippi-licensed gaming establishments.35 
After calculating state-taxable income, a state determines a 
resident’s state tax liability by applying its tax rates. Each state 
 
 29. For example, Massachusetts incorporates federal tax law dynamically. See MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 63, § 1 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012) (defining “gross income” for state tax 
purposes as “gross income as defined under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, as 
amended and in effect for the taxable year”). Ten states clearly forbid dynamic incorporation of 
federal law as a violation of state constitutional nondelegation principles. See Dorf, supra note 
3, at 109 n.14. The constitutions of twelve states explicitly permit dynamic incorporation of 
federal tax law. Id. Courts in yet other states have approved dynamic incorporation of federal 
tax law even in the absence of express constitutional authorization. Id. 
 30. See generally OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17 (compiling data indicating that, of the 
forty-one states with broad-based taxes, fifteen adopt the current tax code as their starting 
point, six do not officially use a federal starting point, and the remainder incorporate statically). 
 31. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 (Supp. 2003). 
 32. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b) (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2013) (“There shall be 
added to federal adjusted gross income: . . . [i]nterest income on obligations of any state other 
than this state . . . to the extent not properly includible in federal adjusted gross income . . . .”). 
 33. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 & n.16 (Supp. 2003). 
 34. See RONALD K. SNELL, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE 
PERSONAL INCOME TAXES ON PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME: TAX YEAR 2010, at 3 
(2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/TaxonPensions2011.pdf.  
 35. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-7-17(3)(a) (2010). 
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chooses its own tax rates. Tax credits provide another opportunity for 
states to tailor their tax base to local conditions and preferences. 
States provide tax credits for a wide variety of taxpayer expenditures, 
including spending on historic preservation, job training, investment 
in energy-saving technologies, organ donation, and adoption.36 In 
addition, to prevent double state-level taxation, all states that tax 
income allow credits for taxes that their residents pay to other states.37 
Many states also incorporate federal tax credits. For example, like the 
federal government, many states offer an earned income tax credit.38 
Of the forty-one states with comprehensive income taxes, six 
employ neither federal AGI nor federal taxable income as the 
starting point for their income calculations.39 I refer to these states as 
“facially nonconforming.” Although their income definitions are not 
formally tied to the federal definitions of income, these states 
nevertheless rely significantly on federal tax law and concepts. For 
example, instead of beginning their income calculations with a 
resident’s federal AGI or federal taxable income, facially non-
conforming states typically begin the calculation by requiring a 
taxpayer to list her wages as stated on her federal Form W-2, together 
with amounts reported on federal Forms 1099 and similar federal tax 
forms.40 These states also typically require a taxpayer to report 
business income in the same way as she reported it on her federal 
Schedule C,41 and they typically rely on the federal Schedule D for 
purposes of calculating capital gains and losses.42 Since the amounts 
 
 36. For detailed descriptions of the tax incentives offered by each state, see generally OLIN 
& SWAIN, supra note 17. 
 37. Id. at 6.  
 38. See id. (noting that twenty-one states have an earned income tax credit). 
 39. See id. at 14, 16, 27, 36, 41, 49 (gathering data on the deviations between the federal tax 
base and the tax bases of the six facially nonconforming states—Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania). 
 40. E.g., ARKANSAS 2010 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX FORM AND INSTRUCTIONS 13–14 
(2010), available at http://www.dfa.arkansas.gov/offices/incomeTax/individual/Documents/
LongBooklet_2010.pdf.  
 41. See, e.g., id. at 14 (requiring state taxpayers to report the amount reported on federal 
Schedule C for business and farm income); see also OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14, 16, 27, 
36, 41 (detailing the significant conformity between five of the six facially nonconforming states 
and the federal government in reporting of business income). Among facially nonconforming 
states, Pennsylvania is the exception. It has its own schedules for business, rental, and farm 
income. See id. at 49. 
 42. See, e.g., ARKANSAS 2010 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX FORM AND INSTRUCTIONS, supra 
note 40, at 14; see also OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14, 16, 27, 36, 41, 49 (noting certain 
deviations between the calculation of capital gains and losses between the federal government 
and facially nonconforming states, but also noting that in two of the six states, the federal and 
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stated on such federal tax forms are calculated by reference to federal 
tax rules, they reflect federal tax policies. Thus, although these states 
do not adopt federal income definitions formally, their tax bases 
substantially conform to the federal tax base, including by allowing 
state residents federal exemptions and other tax benefits.43 
II.  ADVANTAGES OF TAX-BASE CONFORMITY 
Federal-state tax-base conformity generates what might be called 
vertical harmonization benefits. By minimizing differences between 
the state and federal tax bases, conformity eases taxpayer compliance, 
enhances state enforcement efforts, and conserves state legislative 
resources.44 
Similarly, by minimizing interstate tax base differences, tax-base 
conformity also secures what might be called horizontal 
harmonization benefits. Among other benefits, harmonization of 
state tax bases facilitates interstate commerce, and it may discourage 
states from enacting protectionist taxes. This Part discusses the 
vertical and horizontal benefits of tax-base conformity. Although this 
Part is primarily descriptive, the benefits it describes should also be 
understood to create pressure for states to conform. 
A. Vertical Harmonization Benefits 
Tax-base conformity generates benefits from vertical 
harmonization of the federal and state tax bases. These are 
advantages that arise from the states having the same tax base as the 
federal government. For example, by requiring state residents to 
report the same amount for state tax purposes as they report for 
federal tax purposes, states reduce taxpayers’ compliance costs.45 
 
state calculations are identical). Again, Pennsylvania is the exception. Although it calculates 
capital gains and losses in the same way as the federal government, it allows taxpayers to take 
all losses in the year incurred, as compared with the federal government, which allows taxpayers 
to offset at most $3000 annually of net capital losses against ordinary income. Compare 72 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 3402-307(E) (West 1995) (providing unlimited deduction for losses on “any 
transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with the trade or business”), with 
I.R.C. § 1211 (2006) (limiting to $3000 the amount of net capital losses that may be applied to 
reduce ordinary income each year). 
 43. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:8A-35 (West 2002) (allowing New Jersey taxpayers 
itemized deductions for charitable contributions and casualty losses but not for other federal 
itemized deductions). 
 44. See, e.g., Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at 125–27. 
 45. State courts reviewing incorporations of federal law for consistency with state 
nondelegation doctrines have acknowledged the administrative gains from following federal 
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Although empirical studies have not specifically estimated the 
compliance cost savings from tax-base conformity,46 conformity avoids 
the need for taxpayers to calculate their income twice or to keep two 
sets of records. Instead, state taxpayers calculate their federally 
taxable income, and then they use this amount to file both federal and 
state taxes. Electronic filing programs even allow taxpayers to file 
federal and state forms together.47 By reducing tax complexity in this 
way, conformity promotes voluntary compliance.48 Moreover, because 
federal tax definitions and concepts are subject to frequent judicial 
and regulatory interpretation, they possess a degree of legal certainty 
that reduces transaction and planning costs.49 
Conformity also aids state tax enforcement goals by enabling 
states to free ride on the elaborate federal administrative mechanisms 
for enforcing federal tax laws. These mechanisms include federal 
withholding, auditing, and third-party reporting requirements.50 
Exchange-of-information agreements between the states and the 
federal government allow the states to learn of federal deficiency 
 
rules and definitions. For example, in upholding the constitutionality of a state statute that 
incorporated the federal corporate tax base, the Connecticut Supreme Court noted the 
“convenience to the taxpayer and economy to the state.” First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of New 
Haven v. Connelly, 115 A.2d 455, 460 (Conn. 1955). Similarly, in discussing Alaska’s system of 
determining state tax liability by reference to federal liability, the Alaska Supreme Court noted 
that the system “was aimed at convenience to the taxpayer and simplicity of administration.” 
Hickel v. Stevenson, 416 P.2d 236, 239 (Alaska 1966). 
 46. Cf. W. Bartley Hildreth, Matthew N. Murray & David L. Sioquist, Interstate Tax 
Uniformity and the Multistate Tax Commission, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 575, 580–88 (2005) (lamenting 
the “sparse and not comprehensive” empirical evidence of corporate compliance costs due to 
nonuniformity of tax bases across the states but hypothesizing that corporate compliance costs 
would be higher without federal base conformity). 
 47. See Harley Duncan & LeAnn Luna, Lending a Helping Hand: Two Governments Can 
Work Together, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 663, 672 (2007) (describing the FedState E-file program). 
 48. HARLEY T. DUNCAN, FED’N OF TAX ADMINS., RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FEDERAL 
AND STATE INCOME TAXES 6 (2005), available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/
taxreformpanel.pdf; cf. Richard D. Pomp, Restructuring a State Income Tax in Response to the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 36 TAX NOTES 1195, 1199–1200 (1986) (arguing that base conformity 
provides states an important opportunity for tax simplification). 
 49. Cf. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719–29 (1997) (discussing 
network and learning effects in the context of standard forms and boilerplate; for example, 
frequent judicial interpretation of widely used contract terms reduces the legal uncertainty 
associated with those terms).  
 50. See Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at 70–72, 75 n.76 (detailing state-federal cooperation in 
enforcement, including, for example, cooperative audits, information-sharing agreements, and 
exchange of personnel).  
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determinations made against their residents.51 The federal and state 
governments also exchange information about the amounts 
individuals file at each level to ensure that they match.52 States can 
use this information to assess their own deficiencies or to begin an 
audit. By increasing the chances of detection, these shared 
enforcement mechanisms may make taxpayers less inclined to 
underreport their income to either level of government. 
Additionally, by relying on the federal tax base, states avoid 
expending scarce legislative resources on devising and maintaining 
their own bases.53 Similarly, state revenue departments can rely on tax 
liability determinations made by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
and federal courts (including the specialized Tax Court),54 and 
conformity enables states to avoid duplicating certain tasks handled 
by the Treasury Department, such as writing tax regulations. Because 
conforming states can rely on expert federal tax legislative drafting, 
regulatory interpretation, and adjudication, conformity allows states 
to reduce their investment in developing expertise in income 
taxation.55 To the extent that state employees need income tax 
expertise, base conformity makes it useful for states to allow their 
employees to participate in IRS training sessions.56 Finally, conformity 
may provide political cover to state lawmakers, who can shift the 
blame to Congress for unpopular state tax policies imported from the 
federal tax base. 
B. Horizontal Harmonization Benefits 
Federal-state tax-base conformity also results in significant tax 
harmonization among the states, which produces benefits of its own.57 
 
 51. See Duncan & Luna, supra note 47, at 668–72 (describing corporate tax information 
sharing in both directions: from the federal government to the states and vice versa). 
 52. See id. at 670 (discussing states’ nascent participation in the State Reverse File Match 
Initiative). 
 53. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 133–35 (detailing legislative costs, including salaries, costs of 
attaining sufficient expertise to write effective legislation, and the costs of “adjusting the law to 
changing circumstances” at the federal level). 
 54. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02[1] (Supp. 2003) (discussing 
the legal effect in various states of federal-level tax-deficiency determinations). 
 55. See Pomp, supra note 48, at 1199 (“[M]any state tax provisions require a higher order 
of administrative capacity than actually exists.”). 
 56. See Duncan & Luna, supra note 47, at 673 (noting that the IRS allows state employees 
to participate in its training programs on a space-available basis). 
 57. The federal tax base serves as a Schelling point for the states—it is the base each state 
expects the others to use, even in the absence of express coordination among the states or 
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For example, it reduces the likelihood that cross-border taxpayers will 
experience unrelieved double state taxation, and it protects state tax 
bases by reducing opportunities for cross-border tax arbitrage. 
Finally, as compared to a situation in which each state autonomously 
devised its own tax base, adoption by the states of the federal tax base 
probably promotes tax subsidization of taxpayer activities whose 
positive benefits spill over to other states. Similarly, conformity also 
may reduce state tendencies to enact tax bases that either 
discriminate against residents of other states or otherwise impose 
negative externalities on other states. 
1. Facilitates Interstate Commerce.  Harmonization of tax bases 
across the states helps people anticipate how they will be taxed if they 
move or expand their business or investment into another state. By 
thus reducing learning costs associated with cross-border movements, 
federal-state tax-base conformity may facilitate interstate commerce 
and the growth of multistate enterprises. 
2. Reduces Double Taxation.  Double taxation occurs when 
multiple states claim to be the source of the same item of income or 
when the income is sourced in one state, but owned by a taxpayer 
who resides in another state. For example, when a law professor 
resides in Connecticut, but earns income in New York, both states 
have jurisdiction to tax him on that income.58 If both states exercise 
their tax jurisdiction, and if Connecticut does not relieve the resulting 
double taxation by crediting New York’s tax, the unrelieved double 
taxation will discourage cross-border work, raising both practical and 
constitutional problems.59 Conformity may help reduce double state 
taxation because states’ methods for avoiding double taxation, 
including apportionment and crediting, work best when all states use 
 
between the states and the federal government. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE 
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–57 & n.1 (1960) (describing the idea that people tend to converge 
on “focal points,” even in the absence of communication). One way Professor Schelling 
illustrated this idea was by asking a group of students what they would do if they arranged to 
meet a friend tomorrow in New York City, but they did not specify where or when; most 
students responded that they would go to the information booth at Grand Central Station at 
noon. Id. 
 58. See Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 849 (N.Y. 2003) (involving a 
Connecticut-resident law professor with New York-source income). 
 59. Double taxation of individuals may violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause and 
the dormant Commerce Clause. See generally HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶¶ 
4.14–4.16 (Supp. 2009); see also id. ¶ 20.06 (Supp. 2003 & Supp. 2012). If so, as the residence 
state, Connecticut would be obliged to credit the taxes assessed by New York. See id. 
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the same tax base. For example, when all states use the same rules for 
sourcing income, double state taxation is less likely to occur.60 
3. Prevents Tax Arbitrage.  Tax arbitrage encompasses tax-
planning devices that exploit differences in the tax laws of two 
different jurisdictions.61 Whereas differences in state tax bases create 
tax-planning opportunities for both individual62 and corporate 
taxpayers,63 federal-state tax-base conformity may reduce deadweight 
loss from tax arbitrage by minimizing differences in state tax bases. 
 
 60. See, e.g., Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 845 (noting that Professor Zelinsky would not have 
suffered unrelieved double state taxation if Connecticut adopted the same “convenience of the 
employer” test as New York; in other words, double taxation would not have arisen if 
Connecticut and New York had the same tax base, including the same sourcing rules); see also 
Shaviro, supra note 15, at 912 (discussing state tax relief for double taxation); cf. John F. Avery 
Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 17–19 (1999) (describing so-called 
qualification conflicts, which arise under double tax treaties when two countries have different 
definitions of income or different national-law characterizations of the same item of income).  
 61. See H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax 
System,” 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 142 (2000) (describing “international tax arbitrage” as “a lofty 
term that refers to taking advantage of differences among country tax systems, usually 
differences in addressing a common tax question” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, 
e.g., Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, Tax Competition and Leviathan, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 
113, 117 (1996) (incorporating an arbitrage condition into an econometric model of tax 
coordination).  
 62. For example, although most states incorporate federal rules for determining capital 
gains and losses, some calculate capital income differently from the federal government. See, 
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-815(b) (2012) (excluding up to 30 percent of net long-term 
capital gains); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.30(1)(p) (West 2003 & Supp. 2012) (providing senior 
citizens an annual deduction—of $9,420 for single returns and $18,840 for joint returns—for 
interest, dividends, and capital gains); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-30.3(2)(d) (2011) (excluding up 
to 30 percent of net long-term capital gains); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-1150(A) (2000 & Supp. 
2012) (excluding 44 percent of long-term capital gains). Several other states—including 
Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, and Kansas—have capital-gains preferences only for certain in-
state assets. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 18–19, 24, 28. Taxpayers can exploit these 
differences by manipulating where they reside or where they realize gains and losses.  
 63. For example, Delaware deviates from the federal corporate tax base by exempting 
certain income from intangible assets. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(b)(8) (2009). In 
response, many multistate corporations transfer their valuable intangibles to holding companies 
that they establish in Delaware. See Lawrence Bajor, The Slow Death of State Tax Arbitrage, J. 
ST. TAX’N, July–Aug. 2007, at 35, 37 (2007) (evaluating the use of Delaware holding companies 
in state tax planning). This structure allows multistate companies to reduce their taxable income 
in other states (by paying deductible licensing fees to their Delaware intangibles holding 
company) while generating no taxable income in Delaware (because the licensing fees are 
exempt there). Delaware’s deviation from the federal tax base succeeded in making it a 
destination for intangible assets held by multistate corporations, but it also generated significant 
litigation as well as defensive legislative responses from several other states attempting to shore 
up their eroded tax bases. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶¶ 6.11, 6.13 (Supp. 
2006) (reviewing states’ jurisdiction to tax out-of-state intangible property). 
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4. Encourages Cross-Border Spillovers.  To the extent that 
federal tax law reflects the larger territorial scope of federal interests, 
federal tax provisions probably reward behaviors whose benefits spill 
over to other states more than would autonomously drafted state tax 
bases.64 If this is so, then by adopting the federal tax base, states 
amplify the salutary effects of any federal tax laws that subsidize 
interjurisdictional spillovers. For example, the federal deduction for 
deposits to traditional IRAs aims to encourage taxpayers to save for 
retirement. The withdrawal in retirement of the earnings from 
traditional IRAs is federally taxable, which serves partially to 
mitigate the federal revenue loss associated with the deduction.65 
When transferred to the state level, this same tax incentive carries an 
additional risk for any state adopting it. The risk derives from the 
possibility that the saver will transfer his or her state of residence 
before withdrawing the earnings in the account. Should the saver 
migrate, the state that subsidized the deposit may lose the 
opportunity to tax the withdrawal because the taxpayer is no longer a 
resident. In this way, the subsidy funded by the state in which the 
taxpayer spends her working years may spill over to the state in which 
she retires. 
Even though such interjurisdictional spillovers may be salutary 
from a national perspective, states presumably would be less likely to 
subsidize them if they constructed their tax bases from scratch. If they 
defined their tax bases from scratch, even states wanting to subsidize 
savings presumably would structure their savings incentives 
differently from the federal government. For example, instead of 
providing an up-front deduction for deposits to retirement accounts, 
states might structure their savings incentives as exemptions of 
withdrawals from such accounts.66 By delaying the timing of the 
subsidy to the taxpayer’s retirement years, the state thereby would 
 
 64. Examples of federal tax provisions that promote behaviors with national benefits 
include, among others, incentives for saving, education, investment in green technologies, the 
purchase of private health-insurance coverage, and special tax benefits available to military 
personnel.  
 65. See I.R.C. § 72(t) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (imposing a 10 percent additional tax on early 
distributions).  
 66. Although most states conform with the federal treatment of IRAs, Pennsylvania, a 
facially nonconforming state, denies deductions or exclusions for contributions by account 
owners to their traditional and Roth IRAs, but it exempts qualified distributions from both 
traditional and Roth IRAs. See PENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, REV-636 PO (02-12), 
RETIREMENT: TRADITIONAL IRAS AND ROTH IRAS (2012), available at http://www.portal.
state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_2_818161_0_0_18/rev636.pdf.  
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avoid the risk of subsidizing savings of taxpayers who will retire 
elsewhere. If avoiding the spillover means that a state does not 
provide a tax subsidy at all, or that it provides a tax subsidy in a less 
effective manner, nonconformity may reduce national welfare. The 
federal tax law contains many incentives for behaviors that create 
positive externalities whose benefits are not limited to any particular 
state. These include incentives for education, military service, and 
reducing pollution and carbon emissions.67 By incorporating these 
incentives into their own tax bases through conformity with the 
federal base, states provide additional incentives for 
interjurisdictional spillovers.68 
For the same reasons, base conformity also may reduce states’ 
use of “not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) taxes. That is, conformity 
may dampen states’ urge to overtax socially productive, but noxious, 
activities, such as radioactive waste disposal.69 
5. Discourages Tax Exportation and Protectionist Taxation.  In 
the same vein, conformity may reduce the extent to which states use 
their tax laws to impose negative externalities on residents of other 
states.70 For example, compared to conforming bases, autonomously 
drafted state tax bases presumably would contain more provisions 
aimed at exporting tax burdens to residents of other states. The goal 
to export taxes to nonresidents can be illustrated with an example 
from international tax. A country may collect what is arguably more 
than its fair share of tax from nonresidents who have minimal 
contacts with its territory. For example, instead of taxing them only 
on their winnings from tournaments in Britain, the United Kingdom 
taxes nonresident athletes on a share of their worldwide endorsement 
 
 67. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 221 (providing a deduction for student-loan interest). 
 68. Whether such additional incentives are salutary depends on the elasticity of the 
behavior and the degree of the federal subsidy. 
 69. Cf. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Designing Tax Policy in Federalist 
Economies: An Overview, 60 J. PUB. ECON. 307, 314, 318–22 (1996) (noting that state tax 
autonomy provides room for NIMBY taxation and suggesting solutions).  
 70. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1484, 1499 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 
(1987)) (arguing that allowing states discretion to set their own product-liability law “created a 
liability monster,” where each state sought to benefit resident plaintiffs while imposing costs on 
nonresident defendants). 
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income, even if they only participate in a single competition in 
Britain.71  
Other examples of attempts to export taxes can be drawn from 
state indirect taxation. For example, states may impose high hotel 
taxes or natural-resource severance taxes because they believe that 
the economic burden of such taxes will fall primarily on nonresidents 
who lack political representation in the taxing state.72 Because 
residents of all states have representation in the federal government, 
however, federal law is less likely than state law to contain provisions 
that aim to shift tax burdens from residents of one state to residents 
of another. 
As compared to a hypothetical state income tax devised 
autonomously by state legislators, the federal tax base also can be 
expected to contain fewer provisions that protect the residents of any 
particular state from competition from residents of other states. This 
is because the temptation to use the tax system to prefer one state 
over another is weaker at the national level than at the state level.73 
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the dormant Commerce 
 
 71. Until 2012, the United Kingdom calculated its share of a nonresident’s global 
endorsement income by a fractional method. The global income was multiplied by the number 
of days spent competing in British tournaments divided by the number of days spent competing 
globally. See Usain Bolt’s Tax Lesson, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2012, at A10. This calculation 
arguably overtaxed athletes whose activities in Britain were limited to competition. Since 2012, 
the United Kingdom has calculated its share of nonresidents’ income by taking into 
consideration days of performance or training in the United Kingdom divided by global days of 
performance or training. Compared to the 2010 rule, this formula generally will result in more 
income being allocated to the athlete’s country of residence, and less to the United Kingdom. 
See Tony Nitti, One Reason the NFL Will Never Permanently Relocate a Team to London: The 
U.K.’s Tax Treatment of Nonresident Athletes, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2012, 10:14 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2012/10/29/one-reason-the-nfl-will-never-permanently-
relocate-a-team-to-london-the-u-k-s-tax-treatment-of-nonresident-athletes/.  
 72. Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617–29 (1981) (rejecting a 
claim that Montana’s coal-severance tax violated the Commerce Clause by exporting tax 
burdens to residents of other states). Whether taxes, such as severance taxes or hotel taxes, 
actually export tax burdens to nonresidents depends on their incidence, which is notoriously 
difficult to determine. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Incidence Analysis and the Supreme Court: 
An Examination of Four Cases from the 1980 Term, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 80 (1982) (noting 
that “any tax levied on a product that is sold primarily to non-residents” is not necessarily an 
exported tax, as it depends on who actually bears the economic burden of the tax). Even if not 
successful in exporting tax burdens, however, taxes that states intend to serve as export taxes 
can be harmful. See Shaviro, supra note 15, at 927–28 (noting that states with such taxes spend 
more than the national average, perhaps due to the belief that residents do not bear the 
incidence of such taxes).  
 73. The federal tax base may reflect population bias in congressional voting rules. See infra 
Part VI.C. 
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Clause to prohibit protectionist state taxation,74 imperfect 
enforcement of that constitutional norm leaves room for gains from 
tax-base conformity.75 Similarly, compared to autonomously drafted 
state tax bases, conforming bases probably contain fewer provisions 
designed to attract mobile residents from other states.76 
6. Helps Identify Unconstitutional Tax Discrimination.  A final 
benefit of tax-base conformity is that it could help taxpayers identify 
discriminatory state tax provisions that are ripe for constitutional 
challenge. For the reasons explained in the last subsection, 
discriminatory state tax provisions that violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause are likely 
to take the form of deviations from the federal tax base. State 
deviation from the federal base results in special reporting by the 
taxpayer on state tax forms, and this special reporting increases the 
political salience of the divergence of state and federal tax policy. For 
example, the itemized deduction that Mississippi grants for gambling 
losses distinguishes between gambling losses incurred in Mississippi 
gaming establishments and those incurred in other states.77 This 
distinction may unconstitutionally discriminate against out-of-state 
gaming establishments.78 As a deviation from the federal tax code, 
claiming the deduction for in-state gambling losses requires special 
 
 74. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (“The modern law of 
what has come to be called the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about economic 
protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by 
burdening out-of-state competitors.” (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 
273–74 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 75. Problems with enforcement stem from, inter alia, difficulties in identifying a party with 
standing to challenge such legislation. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 
(2006) (vacating, for lack of standing, the Sixth Circuit’s judgment in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, 
Inc., 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), which held that an Ohio business tax credit discriminated 
against interstate commerce); see also Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: 
Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 405–
22 (1996) (discussing judicial standing obstacles to dormant Commerce Clause challenges of 
state tax incentives that distort interstate commerce). Such state tax incentives take the form of 
deviations from the federal tax base. See infra Part IV. 
 76. Cf. Enrich, supra note 75, at 406, 467 (arguing that the Supreme Court should strike 
down as violations of the dormant Commerce Clause state tax incentives designed to poach 
business from other states). For the other side of the argument, see infra Part IV. 
 77. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 78. The Supreme Court has given potentially discriminatory subsidies, like the Mississippi 
deduction, less scrutiny than potentially discriminatory taxes. See, e.g., New Energy, 486 U.S. at 
278 (distinguishing between discriminatory taxes and direct subsidies for domestic industry). 
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reporting on Mississippi tax forms,79 which increases the salience of 
the deduction. Although not all state tax deviations are 
discriminatory, their high salience may increase the likelihood of a 
constitutional challenge to those that are discriminatory, which may, 
in turn, discourage states from enacting discriminatory deviations in 
the first place. 
III.  DISADVANTAGES OF TAX-BASE CONFORMITY 
By incorporating federal definitions of income into their own tax 
laws, states delegate to the federal government authority over 
important aspects of their fiscal systems. As a result, tax-base 
conformity has generated legal challenges under the nondelegation 
principles of many states’ constitutions,80 and several states have 
specific provisions in their constitutions to accommodate federal tax-
base conformity.81 
Rather than analyzing whether tax-base conformity violates state 
constitutions or other state laws, however, this Part assumes that state 
incorporation of the federal tax base is legal in order to analyze the 
disadvantages of tax-base conformity. Section A explains how tax-
base conformity reduces state tax autonomy. Section B considers how 
the harmonization that results from tax-base conformity undermines 
 
 79. MISS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, FORM 80-108, ADJUSTMENTS & CONTRIBUTIONS 1 (2012) 
available at http://www.dor.ms.gov/docs/indiv_80108128.pdf. 
 80. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 108–11 (reviewing the status of tax-base conformity under 
state nondelegation doctrines). Compare Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 27 
A.2d 62, 63–64 (Pa. 1942) (upholding dynamic incorporation of the federal definition of net 
income against nondelegation challenge), with Wallace v. Comm’r of Taxation, 184 N.W.2d 588, 
593 (Minn. 1971) (holding that dynamic incorporation of federal tax law would violate the 
Minnesota Constitution’s nondelegation principle). Static incorporation of federal tax law 
generally does not constitute a delegation of state legislative power, but dynamic incorporation 
may. Several state courts have held that even dynamic federal-state tax-base conformity does 
not represent a legislative delegation. For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated: 
This is not a delegation of legislative power but an incorporation by reference of the 
federal law into the state law. State law lays a tax on the franchise or privilege of a 
corporation to do business in this state. The state legislature and not the Congress has 
selected net earnings as the base for determining the amount of this tax and has fixed 
the rate to be paid on that tax base. As a matter of convenience to the taxpayer and 
economy to the state, the legislature has adopted some of the standards [including the 
definition of gross income] employed in the federal corporation net income tax law. 
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of New Haven v. Connelly, 115 A.2d 455, 459–60 (Conn. 1955) 
(citations omitted).  
 81. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (“In enacting any law imposing a tax on or 
measured by income, the legislature may define income by reference to provisions of the laws of 
the United States as they may be or become effective at any time or from time to time, whether 
retrospective or prospective in their operation.”).  
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federalism values, such as diffusion of power and regulatory diversity. 
Finally, Section C shows that the loss of state tax autonomy under 
base conformity causes fiscal volatility because states that 
dynamically incorporate federal tax law open themselves to revenue 
shocks from changes in federal law. 
Two factors tend to mitigate the disadvantages of federal-state 
tax-base conformity. First, because the regulatory impact of taxation 
is a function of both the base and the rate, by retaining control over 
their tax rates, states retain an important fiscal policy tool. Second, 
states can (and do) deviate from federal tax provisions. Later, in Part 
V, I will argue that the ability of the states to deviate from federal tax 
law significantly mitigates the disadvantages of tax-base conformity. 
For purposes of identifying and describing those disadvantages, 
however, this Part assumes complete federal-state tax-base 
conformity. 
A. State Tax Autonomy 
When states conform to the federal tax base, they cede to the 
federal government at least three kinds of authority. First, they 
relinquish the ability to determine structural and definitional aspects 
of their income taxes, such as whether to tax imputed income and 
how to treat married taxpayers. Second, they cede authority to 
determine tax incentives. Finally, tax-base conformity allows the 
federal government to set the policy agenda for state income taxation. 
1. Structure and Definition of Income.  By conforming their tax 
bases to that of the federal government, states voluntarily cede 
control over decisions about the structure of their income taxes and 
about how to define income. Structural and income-defining decisions 
are those a government must make to assess income taxes, even if it 
does not intend to use tax incentives to regulate behavior. These 
decisions include who should be taxed, how often, and how to define 
income. If these questions had uncontroversial answers, then ceding 
structural and income-defining tax authority to the federal 
government would be unproblematic. In reality, these questions 
involve a large set of well-known and controversial issues. 
For example, federal law does not tax imputed income. Imputed 
income includes the value of services a taxpayer provides for herself 
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and the value of using capital assets that she owns.82 For instance, 
when a taxpayer resides in a house that she owns, she has imputed 
rental income. Taxing all imputed income is impossible because we 
cannot accurately estimate the amount of each taxpayer’s imputed 
income. But many have criticized the inequities caused by the failure 
to tax at least those sources of imputed income that could be taxed 
reasonably accurately, such as imputed rental income.83 By adopting 
the federal tax base, states defer to federal choices, including the 
decision not to tax imputed rental income, even though the 
experiences of other countries have shown that taxing imputed rental 
income is administrable and can reduce tax inequities between 
otherwise similarly situated renters and homeowners.84 
Likewise, the federal tax system generally does not tax 
appreciation until disposition of the appreciated asset.85 Under this 
“realization rule,” taxpayers accumulating wealth in the form of asset 
appreciation need not pay tax currently, whereas taxpayers who earn 
income from work cannot defer tax.86 The realization rule thereby 
regressively shifts the tax burden away from those with asset 
appreciation. As with imputed income, the primary justifications for 
the realization rule are practical impediments, such as valuation and 
liquidity problems. Specifically, because we often do not know the 
exact value of an asset until its sale, we cannot accurately tax it until 
then. Likewise, if appreciation were taxed before disposition of the 
appreciated asset, taxpayers might not have the cash to pay the tax. 
 
 82. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 124 (5th ed. 2005).  
 83. Because federal law does not tax imputed rental income, for example, homeowners pay 
less tax than similarly situated renters, who must pay their rent with after-tax income. For 
historical analysis of this issue, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History 
and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 255–70 
(2010). 
 84. See, e.g., HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 181–83 (2010) (noting that although many countries have been moving 
away from taxing imputed rental income for administrative reasons, the Netherlands has 
retained its imputed rental tax); see also Paul E. Merz, Foreign Income Tax Treatment of the 
Imputed Rental Value of Owner-Occupied Housing: Synopsis and Commentary, 30 NAT’L TAX J. 
435, 435 (1977) (noting that in the mid-1970s, forty-two countries taxed imputed rental income); 
cf. Ventry, supra note 83, at 256–57 (noting that acknowledgment of the regressive nature of the 
home mortgage deduction prompted federal lawmakers in the United States to consider taxing 
imputed rental income); id. at 257 (discussing solutions to the practical obstacles to taxing 
imputed rental income and noting that Wisconsin “experimented with taxing net [imputed] 
rental income under its income tax”). 
 85. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1001 (2006). 
 86. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 82, at 147. 
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Despite the fact that the realization rule arguably results in an unjust 
distribution of the tax burden, the federal government maintains it, 
even for assets—such as publicly traded securities—that can be easily 
and accurately valued and against which taxpayers could readily 
secure loans to provide the cash needed to pay any taxes due.87 By 
adopting the federal tax base, the states adopt the same decision. 
Other classic base-defining conundrums (and how Congress resolves 
them) include whether to tax windfalls (yes),88 how often to tax 
(annually),89 whether to allow income averaging to mitigate income 
volatility (no),90 whether to adjust tax basis for inflation (no),91 and 
many more. 
Decisions about the so-called taxable unit warrant lengthier 
treatment. The federal tax system permits four filing statuses: single, 
head-of-household, married-filing-jointly, and married-filing-
separately. A large body of scholarship discusses the impact of this 
seemingly innocuous set of filing statuses.92 In progressive tax systems, 
joint filing provides a tax “bonus” to married couples who earn 
income unevenly, because, by averaging their incomes, it allows such 
spouses to lower their joint tax burden compared to if they were 
single. However, married couples that earn income equally may pay a 
“marriage penalty”; they pay more tax as a married couple than the 
 
 87. See, e.g., David A Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAX L. REV. 95 
(1999) (exploring mark-to-market taxation for assets that are liquid and easy to value). 
Experiences of other countries that maintain wealth taxes or imputed income taxes demonstrate 
that the administrative difficulties posed by the need for annual valuation of at least some kinds 
of assets are not insurmountable. See generally Moris Lehner, The European Experience with a 
Wealth Tax: A Comparative Discussion, 53 TAX L. REV. 615 (2000) (detailing the wealth taxes  
and imputed income taxes of eleven European countries). 
 88. See I.R.C. § 61 (2006); Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429–30 (1955) 
(holding that I.R.C. § 61 (1954) taxes windfalls). 
 89. I.R.C. § 441 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 90. See id. §§ 441–483 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (permitting only cash basis and accrual 
accounting, and requiring annual reporting); see also Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against 
Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1151, 1155–56 (2006) (“[P]eople who temporarily earn 
very high incomes due to short-term success pay annual taxes at the same rates as do people 
whose high incomes are a permanent part of their lives.”). 
 91. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 82, at 363–65. 
 92. See generally, e.g., Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a 
Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651 (2010); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus 
Reality: The Partnership Model of Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 
1413 (1996); Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 1509 (2006); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 
(1994).  
MASON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2013  6:54 PM 
1292 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1267 
sum of the taxes they would pay if they were single.93 Commentators 
observe that, by providing tax bonuses to couples that earn income 
unevenly, the federal tax system favors traditional single-earner 
households.94 In contrast with the filing status choices made by the 
federal government, many other countries either reject joint filing or 
provide married couples the option to file jointly or individually.95 
When states conform to federal filing statuses, they thereby import 
into their own law the biases inherent in those statuses. 
These examples show that, even before considering whether to 
use taxes expressly to regulate, governments face a series of difficult 
base-defining and structural decisions. How governments resolve 
these issues influences taxpayer behavior and affects the distribution 
of the tax burden across members of society. When states adopt 
without deviation the federal tax base and filing rules, they import 
federal decisions on these matters into their own tax systems. 
2. Incentives.  When the states incorporate the federal tax base, 
they not only cede income-defining and structural tax authority, they 
also cede regulatory authority in a more traditional sense, given that 
the federal government uses tax incentives to regulate taxpayer 
behavior. Although the primary function of the federal tax base is to 
measure taxpayers’ net income in order to apply progressive tax rates 
fairly, that is not its only function. The tax law contains many 
provisions designed to serve policy goals or voter preferences, rather 
than (or in addition to) defining income.96 When such provisions take 
the form of tax subsidies—such as tax deductions, exemptions, and 
credits—tax experts call them “tax expenditures” to highlight the 
 
 93. This result would occur if, for example, the progressive tax brackets that apply to 
married couples are less than twice as large as those that apply to single taxpayers. See, e.g., 
Kahng, supra note 92, at 656–59 (defining and discussing marriage penalties). 
 94. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 92, at 371 (“The current joint-return system is not neutral. 
It favors the traditional family both in the behavioral sense that it discourages women from 
working, and in the distributive sense that it ignores the fact that a one-earner couple is really 
better off than a two-earner couple with the same taxable income.”). 
 95. See Kornhauser, supra note 92, at 1437 n.56 (noting that most Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development countries tax spouses separately). 
 96. Whether a tax deduction is needed to measure net income properly depends on 
whether the activity that generates the deduction is related to the production of taxable income. 
For example, business expenses (such as inventory costs) are expenses related to producing 
taxable income and therefore must be deducted in order to properly calculate net income. But 
the home mortgage-interest deduction is not necessary for measuring net taxable income 
because the United States does not tax the imputed rental income associated with a personal 
residence. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
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revenue losses they generate.97 In contrast, when such provisions take 
the form of new or increased taxes, acceleration of tax liabilities, or 
denials of exemptions, deductions or tax credits, they have been 
called “tax penalties” to highlight their purpose to discourage 
particular taxpayer behavior.98 
By importing federal definitions of income, states thereby also 
import any federal tax incentives embedded in those definitions. As a 
result, states subsidize activities Congress has chosen to subsidize, and 
they penalize activities Congress has chosen to penalize. Among the 
many activities subsidized by federal tax incentives are home 
ownership,99 employer provision of health insurance,100 charity,101 
savings,102 and family planning.103 Congress also has used the federal 
tax law to penalize gambling,104 failure to save,105 failure to buy private 
health insurance,106 and participation in the illegal drug trade.107 The 
federal tax law also denies business deductions for certain disfavored 
activities, such as the payment of antitrust treble damages,108 fines and 
penalties,109 bribes and kickbacks,110 and certain kinds of disfavored 
employee compensation.111 A state that fully conformed its own tax 
 
 97. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 35–37.  
 98. E.g., Mason, supra note 2, at 978; Eric Zolt, Deterrence via Taxation: A Critical Analysis 
of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 343–44 (1989). 
 99. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2006) (allowing deductions for home mortgage interest). 
 100. See id. § 106 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (excluding employer-paid health-insurance 
premiums from gross income). 
 101. See id. § 170 (allowing charitable-contribution deductions). 
 102. See, e.g., id. § 219 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (allowing deductions for contributions to 
retirement savings accounts). 
 103. See id. § 213 (2006) (allowing deductions for qualified medical expenses); INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., PUB. 502, MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 5–6, 13–14 (2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p502.pdf (explaining that deductions include expenses for birth-
control pills, sterilization, vasectomies, abortions, and fertility treatments). 
 104. See I.R.C. § 165(d) (denying losses from wagering to the extent that they exceed the 
taxpayer’s gains from wagering). 
 105. Congress provides both tax subsidies to encourage savings and tax penalties to 
discourage withdrawal of funds from tax-advantaged savings accounts. See, e.g., id. 
§ 72(m)(5)(B), (q), (t), (v) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (taxing early withdrawals from retirement 
plans and IRAs). 
 106. See id. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2011) (making the tax effective in 2014).  
 107. See id. § 280E (2006) (denying expenses related to illegal drug-trade profits). 
 108. Id. § 162(g) (2006).  
 109. Id. § 162(f). 
 110. Id. § 162(c). 
 111. See, e.g., id. § 162(m) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (limiting public companies’ deductions to 
$1 million for non-performance-based compensation paid to certain key employees); id. § 280G 
MASON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2013  6:54 PM 
1294 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1267 
base to the federal tax base likewise would incentivize and penalize 
these same activities. Already a signficant mode of federal regulation, 
federal tax incentives are on the rise,112 and as federal use of tax 
incentives increases, so does state importation of federal policy 
preferences through tax-base conformity. 
3. Agenda-Setting and Other Authority.  Although as a formal 
matter states incorporating the federal tax base retain control over 
their income tax policy agendas, as a practical matter tax-base 
conformity results in the transfer of agenda-setting power from the 
states to the federal government. For states with dynamic 
incorporation of federal law, federal tax changes automatically take 
effect at the state level unless the state legislature acts to decouple 
from federal law. Likewise, states with static incorporation must pay 
careful attention to federal tax changes in order to minimize 
divergence between the state tax base and the federal tax base 
because divergence erodes the advantages of conformity. In either 
case, the states cede to the federal government significant influence 
over state income tax agendas. 
States adopting the federal tax base also cede nonlegislative 
authority. For example, they cede regulatory and enforcement 
authority to the Treasury Department by accepting Treasury’s tax 
regulations as authoritative and by relying on IRS auditing and 
enforcement. They also cede judicial authority when they accept the 
outcome of federal tax adjudications as determinative of state income 
tax liability.113 
B. Harmonization Costs 
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution created a government 
structure that ensured competition among governments: state 
governments would compete with one another, and the federal 
government would compete with those of the states. Through 
competition and diffusion of power, federalism would preserve 
individual liberty, discipline government, and make government 
 
(2006 & Supp. V 2012) (disallowing employer deduction for certain golden-parachute 
payments).  
 112. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 25–28 (providing statistics 
on federal tax incentives).  
 113. See supra note 54.  
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representatives more responsive to voters.114 Because tax-base 
conformity concentrates at the federal level what would otherwise be 
tax power “diffused” across the fifty states, it undermines one of the 
bulwarks against oppression inherent in our federal system.115 The 
broad array of subject matters the federal government can and does 
reach with its taxing power makes federal-state tax-base conformity 
especially problematic. By conforming to the federal tax law, states 
mirror federal regulatory choices, even in areas, such as the family, 
that traditionally have been the province of the states.116 
Moreover, by providing one-stop shopping for federal and state 
tax benefits, tax-base conformity also may facilitate lobbying and 
rent-seeking. Narrow and well-organized political interests may use 
lobbying at the federal level to secure benefits at both the federal and 
state levels.117 Nor does base conformity necessarily reduce rent-
seeking at the state level; interest groups unable to secure favorable 
federal tax legislation may take a second bite at the apple at the state 
level. 
This Section explores how tax-base conformity impacts 
federalism values. It considers how the harmonization that results 
from states’ incorporation of the federal tax base reduces policy 
diversity and may raise political accountability concerns. Tax-base 
conformity also undermines conforming states’ ability to tailor tax 
incentives to local conditions, and it limits policy experimentation.118 
 
 114. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 265 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
(describing federalism as creating a “double security” of the “rights of the people” because the 
“different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by 
itself”); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism “makes 
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry”). 
 115. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (noting that federalism secures 
liberty through the “diffusion of sovereign power” (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). The Supreme 
Court invoked the liberty-securing function of federalism when it stated that “[p]erhaps the 
principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government power” and that “a 
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk 
of tyranny and abuse from either front.” Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.  
 116. For examples of regulatory federal tax provisions, see supra Part III.A.1. 
 117. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the 
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 55–57, 
71–125 (1990) (analyzing tax legislation under various theories, including public choice). 
 118. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (recounting federalism values, including “sensitiv[ity] to 
the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society” and “innovation and experimentation in 
government”); see also McConnell, supra note 70, at 1493–1500 (discussing advantages of 
federalism, including “that local laws can be adapted to local conditions and local tastes” and 
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1. Voter Preferences.  As an initial matter, we might conclude 
that state delegation of taxing authority to Congress poses no 
democratic problem because state residents also have representation 
in the federal government.119 Some might even argue that upward 
delegations from the states to the federal government are democracy-
enhancing, because people pay more attention to federal politics than 
to state politics, and because state elections have lower participation 
levels than do national elections.120 Even if we did not conclude that 
delegating up by the states was democracy-enhancing, most would 
agree with Professor Dorf’s conclusion that such delegations sharply 
contrast with national delegations of authority to supranational 
bodies, such as the United Nations.121 After all, with federal-state tax-
base conformity, the “delegate” is Congress, a relatively transparent, 
well-monitored, democratically elected body. Indeed, in cases in 
which state and federal voters agree on substantive policy, state 
incorporation of federal law is unproblematic. For example, state and 
federal voters are likely to agree that business expenses should be 
deductible from gross income. As a result, state incorporation of 
§ 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows taxpayers to deduct 
“ordinary and necessary” business expenses,122 is unlikely to generate 
controversy. 
But federal-state tax-base conformity raises democratic concerns 
when the preferences of state voters differ from those of national 
voters. In a case interpreting Minnesota’s nondelegation principle to 
permit only static, rather than dynamic, incorporation into state law 
of the federal definition of adjusted gross income, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court highlighted the problem when it observed that 
 
“that state and local governmental units will have greater opportunity and incentive to pioneer 
useful changes”). 
 119. Cf. Dorf, supra note 3, at 108–10, 135–36, 153–58 (comparing tax-base conformity with 
international delegation and considering whether representation within decisionmaking 
structures might ameliorate democratic losses). 
 120. Cf. Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in 
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1326 (1994) (“For much of this century, the 
states were generally considered to be the least representative . . . and the least accountable of 
our three levels of government.”); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes 
on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 915 (1994) (“[T]he story of participation in state 
and local government regularly features low voter turnouts, entrenched elites, and narrow-
minded policies.”); id. at 909, 936–51 (arguing that in the United States, “our real community is 
a national one”). 
 121. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 112–13. 
 122. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006).  
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[t]he amounts which are to be included or excluded in the 
determination of [federal] adjusted gross income are numerous and 
are subject to change. Many of the exclusions are based on political 
and social rather than economic considerations. The same political 
and social considerations which are of significance to the Federal tax 
policy are not necessarily of significance to the state’s tax collection 
scheme. . . . Any and all of these provisions, as well as others, may 
be changed at any time by the Congress of the United States—
without consulting the Minnesota Legislature.123 
Because Congress uses the tax law to pursue a large number of 
diverse regulatory programs, national and state preferences are likely 
to diverge in at least some cases. Two politically charged examples 
will demonstrate the point that by incorporating the federal tax base, 
states may end up substituting national preferences for state 
preferences. 
The first example involves same-sex marriage. Several states 
recognize same-sex marriage, but the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA)124 provides that federal tax provisions that rely on a 
spousal relationship will not apply to same-sex married couples.125 
Whether DOMA increases or decreases the federal tax liability of 
same-sex married couples compared to similarly situated opposite-sex 
married couples depends on several factors, including whether the 
same-sex spouses earn their income equally or unequally.126 In some 
cases, the effect of DOMA is to increase same-sex couples’ tax 
liability compared to similarly situated opposite-sex couples.127 For 
 
 123. Wallace v. Comm’r of Taxation, 184 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Minn. 1971).  
 124. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 125. DOMA provides that:  
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 
1 U.S.C. § 7. As a result, any federal tax benefits that depend on taxpayers’ married status 
exclude same-sex married couples. 
 126. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Patricia A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
481, 498–99 (2009) (citing 2004 Congressional Budget Office estimates that repealing DOMA 
would increase federal tax collections because of imposition on same-sex couples of the 
“marriage tax penalty” and the disallowance of the option for members of same-sex married 
couples to elect “Head of Household” filing status). For a discussion of states’ incorporation of 
federal filing statuses, see generally Heather Field, Binding Choices: Tax Elections and Federal-
State Conformity, 32 VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171339. 
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example, DOMA prevents same-sex couples from claiming marriage-
related tax benefits, such as joint filing and the exclusion of fringe 
benefits provided by an employer to the employee’s spouse.128 In 
other cases, DOMA reduces same-sex couples’ tax liability compared 
to similarly situated opposite-sex couples. For example, because 
same-sex married couples are not considered spouses for purposes of 
federal tax anti-abuse rules,129 they have greater tax planning 
opportunities.130 
States that incorporate without deviation federal tax filing 
statuses or the federal definitions of adjusted gross income or taxable 
income thereby import into their own tax systems differences in the 
treatment of same- and opposite-sex married couples. In states 
recognizing same-sex marriage, this incorporation may raise state 
constitutional questions,131 and it also substitutes national for state 
preferences regarding marriage equality. Such substitution would be 
especially troubling from a democratic perspective in states where 
recognition of same-sex marriage was prompted by popular 
referendum.132 Whereas states that recognize same-sex marriage have 
 
 128. For a brief summary of federal tax disadvantages to same-sex married couples under 
DOMA, see Cain, supra note 127, at 501–03, which provides a nonexhaustive list of such 
disadvantages, including the inability of one spouse to itemize deductions while the other takes 
the standard deduction.   
 129. See 1 U.S.C. § 7. Federal anti-abuse rules include provisions of the federal tax law 
designed to prevent related parties from securing tax benefits from transactions that lack 
economic substance. For example, a person cannot recognize a loss for tax purposes on property 
sold to his or her spouse. See I.R.C. § 1041 (2006) (treating as a nonrecognition event sales 
between spouses). For a broad and illuminating set of examples, see Theodore P. Seto, The 
Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529, 1548–93 (2008). 
 130. See Seto, supra note 129, at 1539–45 (arguing that same-sex couples should trigger tax 
anti-abuse rules that apply to related parties because if such rules do not apply, same-sex 
couples will be able to avoid tax more easily than similarly situated opposite-sex couples). Tax-
planning opportunities available more to same-sex than opposite-sex couples under DOMA 
include income shifting, avoidance of marriage penalties, the ability to claim larger earned 
income tax credits despite larger family incomes, avoiding taxation of Social Security benefits, 
the ability for one spouse to claim the standard deduction while the other claims itemized 
deductions, and so on. Id. at 1559–80; see also Cain, supra note 127, at 501–03 (noting that, 
among other strategies, same-sex couples can more easily recognize capital losses while still 
maintaining control of the loss property).  
 131. Cf., e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906–07 (Iowa 2009) (holding that denying 
same-sex couples marriage licenses violated their equal-protection rights under the Iowa 
Constitution). 
 132. The law of New York, for example, provides that a “marriage that is otherwise valid 
shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex.” 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(1) (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2012); see also Rebecca DiLeonardo, 
Washington Governor Certifies Same-Sex Marriage Referendum, JURIST (Dec. 6, 2012, 12:46 
PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/12/washington-governor-certifies-same-sex-marriage-
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deviated from some of the federal tax provisions that treat same-sex 
married taxpayers as unmarried, Part V shows why conforming states 
cannot—as a practical matter—eliminate all differences of tax 
treatment under DOMA between same- and opposite-sex married 
couples.133 
The second politically charged example involves the large set of 
federal tax preferences claimable by taxpayers who are not U.S. 
citizens. With very few exceptions, the same federal tax laws apply to 
all individuals who are tax residents of the United States, regardless 
of their citizenship or immigration status.134 Noncitizens qualify as 
U.S. residents for tax purposes if they are green card holders135 or if 
(to simplify greatly) they are physically present in the United States 
for more than half the tax year.136 Although qualification as a U.S. tax 
resident triggers disadvantageous worldwide income taxation, it also 
brings advantages. All U.S. tax residents, including those who hold 
neither citizenship nor green cards, may claim most federal tax 
benefits, including charitable deductions, mortgage deductions, state 
and local tax deductions, exemptions for employer-provided health 
care, deductions for contributions to savings plans, and so on.137 
 
referendum.php (noting that same-sex marriage was approved by popular referendums in 2012 
in Maine, Maryland, and Washington, and that same-sex legislation has passed in five other 
states: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont).  
 133. See infra notes 265–267 and accompanying text.  
 134. Sections 1 and 61 of the Internal Revenue Code assess taxes against all “individuals” 
without exception. These provisions would seem to include citizens as well as all aliens, resident 
and nonresident. Sections 2(d) and 871, however, provide for a special regime applicable to 
“nonresident aliens.” Compare I.R.C. §§ 1(a)–(d), 61 (2006) (assessing taxes against all 
“individuals”), with id. §§ 2(d),  871 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (providing special tax rules for 
“nonresident alien[s]”).  
 135. Lawful permanent residents of the United States are commonly called green card 
holders. See, e.g., Green Card (Permanent Residence), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/greencard (last updated May 13, 2011). 
 136. See id. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (defining tax resident to include “lawful permanent 
resident[s] of the United States”); see also id. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii) (defining tax resident to 
include aliens meeting a substantial physical presence test, regardless of their immigration 
status). Anyone who is neither a U.S. resident as defined in § 7701(b)(1) nor a U.S. citizen is a 
“nonresident alien.” id. § 7701(b)(1)(B). A separate tax regime denies nonresident aliens almost 
all federal tax expenditures. See id. § 873 (denying nonresident aliens most personal 
deductions).  
 137. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 519, U.S. TAX GUIDE FOR ALIENS 8, 28 
(2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p519--2010.pdf. Congress has imposed 
immigration-status restrictions on a few tax expenditures, including the earned income tax 
credit. To claim a dependent child under the earned income tax credit, the taxpayer, her spouse, 
and her qualifying child(ren) all must possess Social Security numbers (SSNs). I.R.C. § 32(m) 
(2006). Since 1996, only citizens, green card holders, and other resident aliens authorized to 
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Rather than constituting evidence of Congress’s special solicitude for 
immigrants or its desire to make the United States an attractive labor 
market for foreigners, the advantageous treatment of tax-resident 
aliens may be simply an unintended artifact of the federal tax law’s 
division of the world of taxpayers into only two categories: residents 
and nonresidents. Whatever the reasons, the federal tax law generally 
does not distinguish among U.S. citizens, green card holders, and 
others who reside for long periods in the United States. Indeed, a 
person may be a U.S. resident for tax purposes even if she was not 
legally admitted to the United States.138 States that incorporate the 
federal tax base will inadvertently channel similar tax benefits to 
immigrants, including undocumented immigrants.139 Extension at the 
state level of these federal tax preferences may undermine other state 
policies that aim to discourage inward migration by non-citizens.140 
 
work in the United States are entitled to SSNs. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra, at 32. As a 
result, aliens residing in the United States who are not authorized to work in the United States 
and who did not obtain an SSN under more liberal regulations applicable before 1996 cannot 
claim the earned income tax credit. 
  The child tax credit (CTC) also contains restrictions based on the citizenship status of 
the children being claimed. U.S. resident taxpayers (citizen and noncitizen, documented and 
undocumented) may claim the CTC for children who are U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, or aliens 
resident (for tax purposes) in the United States. No one may claim the CTC for alien children 
who reside outside the United States. See I.R.C. § 24(c)(2) (2006) (denying CTCs to those 
whose dependents are not “resident[s] of the United States”); id. § 152(b)(3)(A) (defining 
dependents); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 972, CHILD TAX CREDIT 2 (2013), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p972.pdf (defining “[a] qualifying child for purposes 
of the child tax credit”). 
  This Article discusses only the eligibility of undocumented aliens who are U.S. tax 
residents for federal tax benefits, and it makes no claim regarding such taxpayers’ actual use of 
those benefits. 
 138. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(3) (determining the tax residence of aliens who are 
not permanent residents by reference to the number of days physically present in the United 
States, without respect to whether the aliens were admitted legally or not). 
 139. Cf. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT 
AUTHORIZED IN THE UNITED STATES WERE PAID $4.2 BILLION IN REFUNDABLE CREDITS 4 
(2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2011reports/201141061fr.pdf 
(discussing refunds of the CTC paid in 2010 to taxpayers who filed their taxes with Individual 
Taxpayer Identification Numbers, rather than SSNs); id. at 6 (noting that the refundable CTC 
“appears to provide an additional incentive for aliens to enter, reside, and work in the United 
States without authorization”).  
 140. For example, Arizona’s controversial Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhoods Act requires state police to verify the immigration status of anyone they stop or 
arrest, and the Act makes it a crime for immigrants to seek or obtain work without 
authorization or to fail to carry federal immigration documents. See Support Our Law 
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 313, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, invalidated in 
part by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511 (2012); see also NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, MORE HARM THAN GOOD: RESPONDING TO STATES’ MISGUIDED EFFORTS TO 
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I have used charged political issues to highlight the regulatory 
impact of federal-state tax-base conformity, but tax-base conformity 
does not represent a commitment to adopt any particular political 
viewpoint (for example, anti-marriage-equality or pro-immigration). 
Rather, under conformity, states adopt the same tax policies as 
Congress, no matter what the content of those policies. Although all 
states deviate at least somewhat from the federal tax base, the 
advantages of conformity appear to be compelling enough that the 
overwhelming majority of states conform closely to the federal tax 
base. The transfer of control over the content of tax policy from the 
states to the federal government represents a democratic loss for state 
residents. It results in the imposition on state residents of a tax regime 
that diverges from the tax regime they would impose on themselves 
through state-level democratic processes, at least under the 
reasonable assumption that state preferences will sometimes differ 
from national preferences. 
2. Political Accountability.  A related criticism about the 
democratic threat posed by federal-state tax-base conformity might 
be that by causing confusion as to whether state or federal legislators 
are responsible for state tax policies, conformity undermines the 
ability of state voters to hold their representatives accountable for 
unwanted tax policies. This argument can be drawn by analogy to 
arguments made in the unfunded-mandates and conditional-grants 
contexts. In holding that Congress could not simply commandeer the 
states to implement federal goals, the Supreme Court in New York v. 
United States141 warned that “where the Federal Government directs 
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt 
of public disapproval, while federal officials who devised the 
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral 
ramifications of their decision.”142 Similarly, commentators have 
reasoned that even though states have the opportunity to opt out of 
conditional federal grants, such grants may cause confusion among 
 
REGULATE IMMIGRATION 11–13, 15–16 (2007), available at 
http://nelp.3cdn.net/b5b735db8dc21687d0_llm6bx88t.pdf (reviewing proposed state legislation 
designed to combat undocumented labor). 
 141. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (striking down the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, tit. I, 99 Stat. 1842 
(1986), which required states to dispose of or take title of radioactive waste created in their 
borders). 
 142. Id. at 169. 
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voters as to whether to hold state or federal legislators (or both) to 
account for the conditions attached to grants.143 The argument that 
federal, rather than state, legislators should be held to account for 
grant conditions seems to rest on the notion that although grants are 
putatively conditional, states’ financial dependence on federal aid 
makes states’ ability to refuse federal grants illusory.144 Thus, some 
commentators see conditional grants as functionally equivalent to 
mandates. 
A similar argument could be made about tax-base conformity. 
Specifically, because the administrative benefits of base conformity 
are so significant—or, put negatively, because the costs associated 
with fully autonomous operation of a state income tax are so high—
states that need to tax income lack a meaningful choice between 
conformity and an autonomous tax base. In short, the argument 
would run, states that seek to tax income must conform to the federal 
tax base, and as a result, state lawmakers should not be held 
politically accountable for the content of the tax base. Or, at a 
minimum, conformity confuses voters as to which level of government 
to hold responsible for the content of the state tax base. Although the 
Supreme Court usually has rejected constitutional challenges to 
conditional grants,145 if conditional grants and base conformity 
actually create voter confusion, that confusion would be undesirable 
as a policy matter. Whether base conformity causes voter confusion 
poses theoretical as well as empirical questions. First is the theoretical 
question of which level (or levels) of government ought to be held 
accountable for the substance of the state tax base, and second is the 
empirical question of how voters actually assign political 
accountability for the content of the state tax base. 
 
 143. Cf. Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial 
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 486 (2002) (describing a 
political win-win for state and federal officials in which both are likely to welcome grants to 
promote local benefits and improve their standing with the electorate). 
 144. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1911, 1933–39 (1995) (explaining different reasons why conditional grants rarely present a 
real choice to states). 
 145. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166–77 (contrasting constitutionally permissible conditional 
grants with unconstitutional commandeering). But see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 
S. Ct. 2566, 2603–07 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., Breyer & Kagan, J.J.) (holding unconstitutionally 
coercive the discretion given under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to Secretary 
of Health and Human Services to withhold all existing Medicaid funds from states that chose 
not to participate in the act’s Medicaid expansion if those states did not comply with any 
Medicaid requirement). 
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3. Tailoring Tax Incentives.  In addition to reducing states’ 
abilities to respond to voter preferences and potentially undermining 
political accountability, tax-base conformity also reduces the ability of 
states to tailor tax incentives to local conditions. Regional differences 
in elasticities of supply and demand can result in the same tax 
incentive having different effects in different states. Consider the 
federal deduction for home mortgage-interest payments.146 The 
effectiveness of the subsidy in encouraging homeownership depends 
in part on the elasticity of the supply of housing. If housing supply is 
inelastic, such that no new houses will be built in response to the 
subsidy, then over time the effect of the subsidy will be to increase 
house prices.147 If the subsidy becomes fully capitalized into higher 
house prices, it will no longer encourage taxpayers to buy homes.148 
Housing supply is more elastic in the Midwest than on the coasts, 
because density is already high on the coasts.149 As a result, it could be 
efficient to selectively subsidize homeownership in the Midwest, but 
not on the coasts. Because federal taxes generally are nationally 
uniform, however, it is difficult for Congress to take advantage of 
such differences in regional elasticities. By incorporating one-size-fits-
all federal tax incentives, states miss the opportunity to tailor their tax 
incentives to local conditions. 
Information asymmetry also can cause tax incentives to be 
inefficient. For example, any time the government tries to encourage 
an activity by subsidizing it, it risks wasting some of the subsidy on 
people who would have engaged in the behavior even without the 
subsidy. The government cannot set the subsidy efficiently because it 
does not know how much subsidy each taxpayer requires to engage in 
the desired behavior, and it is in the taxpayer’s interest to exaggerate 
the amount she requires in the hopes of increasing the subsidy.150 If an 
imaginary creature—call it Pigou’s Demon—could reveal each 
taxpayer’s elasticity, the government could get subsidies exactly right. 
But without Pigou’s Demon, preferences stay hidden and the 
government cannot provide perfect subsidies. Such information 
 
 146. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2006). 
 147. William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber & Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Encouraging 
Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 TAX NOTES 1171, 1179 (2007).  
 148. For an explanation of capitalization using numerical examples, see Deborah M. Weiss, 
Tax Incentives Without Inequity, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1949, 1955–62 (1994).  
 149. Gale et al., supra note 147, at 1179. 
 150. Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax 
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 1009–10 (1986). 
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asymmetries are thought to be smaller between taxpayers and states 
than between taxpayers and the federal government because states 
are closer to the people and presumably have better access than does 
the federal government to information about them.151 If this is so, then 
it would be more effective for states to use their superior information 
to set their own tax incentives than for states simply to copy federal 
incentives.152 Data maintained by the federal government show that 
claims for federal tax incentives vary widely by state,153 reflecting 
differences in the attributes of state residents and suggesting potential 
efficiency gains from greater tailoring of tax incentives to state 
attributes. 
4. Policy Experimentation.  Federal-state tax-base conformity 
erodes another traditional benefit of federalism: that federalism 
allows the states to conduct regulatory experiments.154 Even when 
residents of all states agree on a particular policy goal, there may be 
different ways of achieving it. Similarly, if a problem shared by all the 
states has different causes in different locations, then the most 
effective strategy for combating that problem will differ regionally. 
For example, although residents of many states may share the goal of 
reducing reliance on fossil fuels, each state’s tax incentives should 
promote the use of alternative energy resources appropriate to that 
state’s particular climate and energy consumption profile. By 
adopting broadly targeted federal tax incentives for green 
 
 151. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005) (“Viewed as a whole, our 
jurisprudence has recognized that the needs of society have varied between different parts of 
the Nation, just as they have evolved over time in response to changed circumstances. Our 
earliest cases in particular embodied a strong theme of federalism, emphasizing the ‘great 
respect’ that we owe to state legislatures and state courts in discerning local public needs.” 
(quoting Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908))); Wallace E. Oates, An 
Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1121–22 (1999) (noting that fiscal 
federalism combines the federal government’s financial power and stability with the states’ 
abilities to know what the public needs). 
 152. Because state tax rates are lower than federal tax rates, state tax subsidies that take the 
form of deductions or exemptions have a smaller incentive effect than their federal equivalents. 
Nevertheless, if states go to the trouble (and revenue expense) of providing tax subsidies at all, 
they have an interest in ensuring that those subsidies are as efficient as possible.  
 153. See generally TAQUESHA CAIN, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INDIVIDUAL INCOME 
TAX RETURNS, BY STATE, 2007 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/11inbystatesprbul.pdf (analyzing and reproducing data from the IRS’s Statistics of Income 
Bulletin showing differences across states in taxpayers’ claims for tax expenditures).  
 154. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(reasoning that states may devise different ways to pursue similar policy goals, thus serving as 
“laborator[ies]” for “social and economic experiments”).  
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technologies through incorporating the federal tax base, however, 
states miss the opportunity to incentivize technologies that are 
particularly effective for their state. Many states have enacted their 
own energy tax incentives in addition to those they incorporate from 
the federal government.155 For example, Arizona subsidizes solar 
energy,156 and Montana subsidizes geothermal energy.157 But to the 
extent that states use these tailored credits in addition to, rather than 
as a substitute for, federal one-size-fits-all solutions, they risk wasting 
revenue on inefficient subsidies.158 Moreover, state-level tax policies 
may conflict with federal tax policies imported into state law by 
incorporation. For example, Georgia’s deviating tax incentive for low- 
and zero-emission vehicles coexists with its federally derived “SUV 
loophole,” which allows expensing of a significant portion of the cost 
of heavy, low-mileage vehicles used in a trade or business.159 Georgia 
imported the federal SUV loophole by incorporating (without 
deviation) the federal calculation of business income.160  
 
 155. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that thirty-eight states provide energy or 
environmental credits).  
 156. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1085 (2006 & Supp. 2012) (providing a tax credit for 
installing a solar energy device in a residence). 
 157. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-32-115 (2012) (providing a tax credit for installation of a 
geothermal heating or cooling system in a principal dwelling). 
 158. Generally, states enact their own green credits in addition to the green tax incentives 
that they import from the federal tax base. Individuals can take advantages of federal energy 
credits covering a wide variety of technologies, including biomass stoves, insulation, geothermal 
pumps, wind turbines, solar and fuel cells, energy-efficient HVAC units and water heaters, and 
energy-efficient cars, such as fuel cell, hybrid, and electric cars. See JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, TAX EXPENDITURES FOR ENERGY PRODUCTION AND CONSERVATION 5–9 (2009) 
(listing federal credits for energy efficiency available to individuals). But see Roberta F. Mann, 
Federal, State, and Local Tax Policies for Climate Change: Coordination or Cross-Purpose?, 15 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 369, 386–91 (2011) (arguing that the failure of federal and state 
governments to coordinate their responses to climate change results in inefficiencies and 
conflicts). 
 159. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-40.16 (2009) (providing Georgia taxpayers with tax 
credits for zero- and low-emission vehicles), with I.R.C. § 179 (2006) (allowing immediate 
expensing of up to $25,000 for the costs of SUVs weighing 14,000 pounds or less and not 
covered by § 280F), and id. § 280F (restricting depreciation deductions for “luxury automobiles” 
weighing 6,000 pounds or less). See generally Lawrence Zelenak, The Loophole That Would Not 
Die: A Case Study in the Difficulty of Greening the Internal Revenue Code, 15 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 469, 473–79 (2011) (giving the history of the federal SUV loophole). Professor Zelenak 
remarks that “[a]lthough the SUV loophole is neither the most economically significant nor the 
most environmentally damaging of the Internal Revenue Code’s offenses against the 
environment, it is among the most transparent and the most outrageous.” Id. 
 160. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 22 (indicating that Georgia does not deviate from 
the federal calculation of business, rent, or farming income); see also GA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
FORM 500, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN 5 l. 3 (2010), available at https://etax.dor.ga.gov/
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C. Fiscal Stability 
Another disadvantage of tax-base conformity is that it injects 
uncertainty into state fiscal systems by increasing the volatility of 
state tax revenues. This volatility makes it more difficult for states to 
meet their financial obligations. One source of volatility is the income 
tax itself—income taxes are more volatile than other kinds of taxes, 
such as property or sales taxes. The second source of volatility stems 
from changes in federal law. 
Professor Kirk Stark has argued that the ability to conform with 
the federal tax base, as well as the other administrative advantages of 
conformity, make it easy for states to assess income taxes. Conformity 
may even make it easier for states to use income taxes than to use 
property or sales taxes. According to Professor Stark, the 
“gravitational pull in favor of base conformity” results in states’ 
overreliance on the income tax base instead of other tax bases.161 The 
problem with state overreliance on income taxation, in Professor 
Stark’s view, is that compared to other kinds of taxes, income taxes 
generate revenue volatility for states.162 Other tax bases, such as 
property and sales, are more stable than the income tax because they 
are not as closely tied to the business cycle.163 
Professor Stark acknowledges, however, that one virtue of state 
reliance on income taxes is that income taxes automatically stabilize 
the economy more than do taxes on other bases, such as property and 
sales taxes.164 Income taxes function as automatic stabilizers because 
when incomes rise, tax payments automatically increase, leaving 
taxpayers with less to spend. On the other hand, when the economy 
contracts and incomes fall, people owe less in taxes as a percentage of 
their income, which dampens the effect of the loss of income on their 
 
inctax/2011_forms/TSD_Individual_Income_Tax_Return_500-2011_Fillable.pdf (listing low- 
and zero-emission-vehicle tax credits).  
 161. Stark, supra note 1, at 432.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 422.  
 164. Id. at 417. For an empirical study on the extent to which federal taxes automatically 
stabilize economic fluctuations, see generally Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The 
Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer 
2000, at 37. 
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ability to consume. The more progressive the tax system is, the more 
it automatically stabilizes the economy.165 
Although income taxes have salutary macroeconomic stabilizing 
effects, federal-state tax-base conformity generates revenue volatility 
unrelated to the business cycle. Specifically, conforming states 
experience revenue volatility stemming from changes in federal tax 
law. Such changes can dramatically increase or decrease state tax 
revenues, and they do not necessarily serve macroeconomic 
stabilizing goals. For example, in 1986 Congress substantially 
broadened the tax base by eliminating many tax preferences. To 
compensate for the broader base, the federal government also 
increased exemptions and the standard deduction, and it lowered tax 
rates.166 Incorporating states that did not amend their exemptions, 
standard deductions, or rates experienced large revenue windfalls.167 
Although some states returned at least some of this windfall to their 
residents,168 such unanticipated revenue windfalls are wasteful; they 
tend to lead to greater government spending,169 which may be 
unsustainable. 
Although most states experienced revenue windfalls due to the 
1986 tax reform, because its overall effect was to lower federal taxes, 
states that assessed taxes as a percentage of residents’ federal tax 
liability experienced significant revenue shortfalls to the extent that 
they did not increase their rates.170 More generally, changes to the 
federal tax law that narrow the tax base or provide new tax subsidies 
 
 165. Cf. Thomas J. Kniesner & James P. Ziliak, Tax Reform and Automatic Stabilization, 92 
AM. ECON. REV. 590, 590 (2002) (finding that lowering tax rates as part of the 1986 tax reform 
reduced the automatic stabilizing effect of the income tax). 
 166. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 (Supp. 2003). 
 167. Id.; see also ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SR-8, THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986—ITS EFFECT ON BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE PERSONAL INCOME 
TAX LIABILITIES 26 (1988) (estimating average percentage increases in state tax revenue due to 
the federal tax changes to be 7.4 percent, ranging from 0.7 percent in New England to 18.9 
percent in the Southwest); id. at 4, 26 (noting that the lowest income quintile of state taxpayers 
faced the largest increases in their state tax liability). 
 168. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 (Supp. 2003). 
 169. See generally Helen F. Ladd, State Responses to the TRA86 Revenue Windfalls: A New 
Test of the Flypaper Effect, 12 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 82 (1993) (finding that states spent 
the windfalls from the 1986 act).  
 170. See Pomp, supra note 48, at 1195 n.1 (noting that in 1986 Nebraska, North Dakota, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont calculated their taxes as a percentage of federal tax); see also 
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 167, at 13 (estimating 
revenue losses in those states respectively at 8.6 percent, 10.2 percent, 11.5 percent, and 9.9 
percent). For a discussion of the state tax consequences of the recent repeal and reinstatement 
of the federal estate tax, see infra note 315 and accompanying text. 
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precipitate state revenue shortfalls. If states fail to either raise their 
tax rates or decouple from revenue-reducing federal legislation, they 
may have trouble meeting their spending obligations. 
Making matters worse, Congress frequently amends federal tax 
law late in the year, or at times when state legislatures are not in 
session.171 Congress also often enacts tax legislation with retroactive 
effect. Such revenue shocks are hard for conforming states to absorb 
because, unlike the federal government, most states’ constitutions or 
statutes limit their ability to issue debt and require them to balance 
their budgets annually, which prevents them from relying on deficit 
spending.172 Thus, revenue volatility is worse for the states than for the 
federal government. 
State revenue volatility from changes in federal law also may 
combine with volatility from the business cycle. Congress may narrow 
the federal tax base during a recession, relying on deficit spending to 
meet its expenses and pay for public programs. For example, federal 
bonus depreciation rules enacted as stimulus in 2002 resulted in 
revenue shortfalls for states that did not decouple from the federal 
rules.173 Although most states have rainy-day funds to help them 
navigate economic downturns, these funds are often insufficient to 
cover gaps.174 Because they cannot deficit spend, to maintain revenue 
when the federal government narrows the tax base, incorporating 
states must take the politically difficult step of increasing tax rates. If 
a state is unable to raise taxes to maintain revenue, it must cut 
spending. Empirical research shows that states exhibit “fiscal 
perversity” in response to recessions.175 Specifically, states raise taxes 
 
 171. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 15, at 980 (noting that the landmark Tax Reform Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. 
(2006 & Supp. V 2012)), was made effective for the 1986 tax year, but was not enacted by 
Congress “until late October of that year, by which time many state legislatures were no longer 
in session”). 
 172. All states except Vermont and Wyoming have balanced-budget requirements, and in 
addition, states have “the expectation and tradition of balanced budgets and the concern that 
state bond ratings may be lowered if the state’s budget does not balance.” U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-93-58BR, BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE 
EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3–4 (1993).  
 173. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 7.02[1][a] (Supp. 2007); see also I.R.C. 
§ 168(k) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (permitting 50 percent of the basis of qualified property to be 
deducted in the first year).  
 174. Forty-five states have rainy-day funds. Michaele Morrow & Robert Ricketts, State 
Conformity with Federal Tax Changes, 32 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N, Fall 2010, at 27, 28 n.2.  
 175. See ALVIN H. HANSEN & HARVEY S. PERLOFF, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE IN THE 
NATIONAL ECONOMY 48 (1944) (coining the term “fiscal perversity”).  
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and cut benefits in bad economic times, even though such procyclical 
responses tend to deepen recessions.176 Welfare programs especially 
suffer from states’ procyclical responses to recessions.177 
IV.  TAX-BASE CONFORMITY AND STATE TAX COMPETITION 
The impact of tax-base conformity on state tax competition 
warrants separate analysis. From the perspective of state tax 
competition, the most important effect of conformity is horizontal 
harmonization. When the states incorporate by reference the federal 
tax base, the states end up using the same tax base—or nearly the 
same tax base—as each other. As a result, it is easier for mobile 
residents to compare tax burdens across states than if each state used 
a completely different base. Perfect base harmonization would allow 
taxpayers to compare state tax burdens by simply comparing nominal 
rates across states. At the other extreme, if every state constructed its 
tax base from scratch, comparing nominal state tax rates would tell 
residents nothing about effective tax burdens. Instead, to understand 
effective tax burdens, taxpayers would have to invest in learning 
about and comparing state tax bases. Whether facilitating the 
comparison of state tax burdens is salutary depends on whether state 
tax competition is productive or destructive.178 
Commentators have argued that tax competition promotes 
welfare by constraining self-interested politicians who, without regard 
to voter preferences, seek to maximize tax revenue and the size of the 
public sector.179 Under this view, residents “tame Leviathan” by 
 
 176. See Super, supra note 16, at 2559. 
 177. See id. at 2613–14 (explaining that during the recessions in 1990–1991 and 2001, state 
spending cuts fell heavily on programs providing cash assistance to the poor).  
 178. Compare Enrich, supra note 75, at 380–405 (arguing that state competition to provide 
business tax incentives creates a lamentable race to the bottom), with Clayton P. Gillette, 
Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 
453–57 (1997) (arguing that the salutary effects of state business tax competition have been 
undervalued). 
 179. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: 
ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 186 (1980) (arguing that despite the 
spillovers between different units in a federal system, tax competition is “an objective to be 
sought in its own right” because of its constraining effect on tax rates and revenue-seeking 
politicians). Professor Wallace Oates’s review of empirical research on decentralization and the 
size of the public sector led him to conclude that the evidence was mixed, but that the strongest 
support for the Leviathan theory could be found on a local level, rather than the state or 
national level. He attributed this outcome to the lower costs of movement between localities 
than between states or nations. See generally Wallace E. Oates, Searching for Leviathan: A 
Reply and Some Further Reflections, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 578 (1989). For an analysis of yardstick 
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exiting—or threatening to exit—the jurisdiction or by politically 
punishing lawmakers for imposing higher taxes than those applicable 
in neighboring states. Proponents of the Leviathan view would regard 
tax-base conformity as salutary because, by making it easier for 
taxpayers to compare tax burdens across states, conformity facilitates 
tax competition, thereby disciplining state taxing and spending. 
On the other hand, if, instead of disciplining government 
officials, state tax competition sparks a destructive race to the bottom 
in which states compete for residents by lowering tax burdens until 
states cannot adequately fund public goods, then tax-base conformity 
is undesirable precisely because it facilitates easy comparison of 
competing tax rates. Using theoretical models, economists have 
shown that tax competition between the states may result in 
inefficiently low tax rates and, consequently, public sectors that are 
too small.180 Empirical evidence provides some support for this view.181 
By obscuring effective tax burdens and thereby dampening 
competition, nonconformity therefore could shore up state tax 
revenues. 
Notice, however, that regardless of whether the dominant effect 
of state tax base competition is to “tame Leviathan” or “beggar thy 
neighbor,” federal-state tax-base conformity does not prevent robust 
tax competition. First, as long as conformity is only partial, states can 
compete with respect to deviations from the federal tax base. 
Additionally, even if all states have identical tax bases, they can still 
compete by offering different tax rates and menus of public goods. As 
long as states can distinguish themselves from each other via tax rates 
and public benefits, state competition can occur. Of course, uniform 
state tax bases would enhance tax competition by making it easier for 
mobile residents to compare state tax burdens. Even in the absence of 
perfect base conformity, however, empirical evidence shows that 
taxpayers discern and respond to differences in overall tax burdens 
 
competition, see generally Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, 
Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1995). 
 180. John D. Wilson & David E. Wildasin, Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon, 88 J. 
PUB. ECON. 1065, 1065 (2004). 
 181. See id. at 1069–72 (discussing several models developed to measure the effect of tax 
competition on the size of local governments). But see Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Competition and 
the European Union: Contrasting Perspectives, 31 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 133, 137 (2001) 
(surveying available empirical evidence and concluding that it shows that tax competition results 
in suboptimal tax levels, but not a “race to bottom” or a “downward spiral in public sector 
activities”).  
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across states.182 Because tax burden competition can take place in the 
absence or presence of federal-state tax-base conformity, knowing 
whether such competition is destructive or salutary does not provide a 
complete answer to the question of whether states should conform to 
the federal tax base. 
Nevertheless, conformity generates certain advantages that do 
not depend on answering the larger question about whether state tax 
competition is net beneficial or destructive. First, conformity aids 
Tieboutian sorting at the state level. Using what he characterized as 
an “extreme”183 theoretical model that included unrealistic 
assumptions,184 economist Charles Tiebout showed that competition 
among localities for mobile residents would lead to efficient provision 
of local public goods because it would reveal taxpayers’ hidden 
preferences for public goods and levels of taxation. In Tiebout’s 
model, taxpayers would reveal these hidden preferences by “voting 
with their feet.”185 Although Tiebout’s work involved local 
governments, rather than states, scholars have applied the same logic 
to mobility among states.186 To the extent that conformity aids in 
revealing taxpayers’ hidden preferences—thereby making the 
provision of public goods more efficient—it is beneficial. 
Another potential benefit of conformity involves the tax 
incentives states offer to attract mobile businesses.187 States compete 
 
 182. See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr., Altered States: Taxes and the Location of Foreign Direct 
Investment in America, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1076, 1080–92 (1996) (finding that corporations 
from countries that exempt foreign-source income are more likely to invest in low-tax U.S. 
states than high-tax U.S. states). 
 183. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 419–
20 (1956). 
 184. Among the other assumptions in Tiebout’s model were that human mobility was 
costless and motivated only by taxes and the availability of locally provided public goods, that 
people’s preferences for taxes and public goods were fixed, that taxpayers had accurate 
information about the tax and benefit profiles of all the jurisdictions, that all the costs of local 
public goods would be borne exclusively by residents (no tax exportation), and that all benefits 
of local expenditures would accrue only to residents (no spillovers). See id. at 419.  
 185. See id. at 420. 
 186. See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Fiscal Federalism in Europe: Lessons 
from the United States Experience, 36 EUR. ECON. REV. 654, 656 (1992) (arguing that centralized 
fiscal policies may counteract “free mobility of labor across the members of an economic 
union”); cf. Wilson & Wildasin, supra note 180 (reviewing the literature on interjurisdictional 
capital tax competition). 
 187. In some cases, business tax incentives are designed to aid in-state business, and are not 
specifically designed to affect locational decisions. In other cases, state tax incentives are 
designed to poach business from neighboring states. See Louise Story, As Companies Seek Tax 
Deals, Governments Pay High Price, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012, at A1 (noting that “corporations 
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to attract mobile businesses not only by lowering their tax rates, but 
also by offering tax incentives. Although many have argued that tax 
burden competition has the beneficial effect of disciplining 
lawmakers, business-tax incentive competition has been harshly 
criticized as a zero-sum game among the states that erodes state tax 
revenues without increasing national welfare.188 To be effective at 
luring business from other states, such incentives must offer benefits 
that cannot be secured elsewhere. Thus, they take the form of 
deviations from the federal tax base. Examples of business-tax 
deviations include tax credits for new equipment put into service 
within the state.189 Because state business-tax incentives represent 
deviations from the federal tax base, they require special reporting on 
state tax forms. As a result, they are more salient to taxpayers, voters, 
and lawmakers than would be business-tax incentives that were part 
of an autonomous state tax base. Deviating state business-tax 
incentives require special reporting on state tax forms. This increased 
salience could help the incentives be more effective as incentives. 
Additionally, it could make such incentives more politically 
accountable, which would be especially important if state business-tax 
incentives represent a destructive race to the bottom among states. 
V.  DECOUPLING STATE AND FEDERAL TAX BASES 
Although the disadvantages of tax-base conformity are 
significant, the fact that all states with income taxes significantly 
conform their tax bases to the federal base suggests that the 
advantages of conformity outweigh the disadvantages. Nevertheless, 
states have been reluctant to maintain strict conformity with the 
federal tax base. For example, in 1972, to ease state administrative 
costs associated with state income taxation, Congress passed the 
 
have. . . creat[ed] a high-stakes bazaar where they pit local officials against one another to get 
the most lucrative package”).  
 188. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 75, at 390–97 (summarizing empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of state tax incentives and finding that the evidence is inconclusive as to whether 
such incentives affect location of business, though they clearly undermine state finances); cf. 
Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Economic Development, 77 
U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 332 (2010) (“[T]here is some evidence that subsidies do not ultimately alter 
the location decisions of firms. And even if location subsidies do enhance local welfare, they do 
not improve overall welfare—one city loses what another city gains.” (footnote omitted)). State 
and local business tax incentives do not have a more a significant impact on locational decisions 
because the value of those incentives is small compared to other factors, such as labor, supply, 
and transportation costs. Enrich, supra note 75, at 391.  
 189. See Enrich, supra note 75, at 382–89 (describing state business tax incentives).   
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Federal-State Tax Collection Act,190 which provided states the ability 
to opt into a program under which the federal government would 
collect state income taxes and remit those taxes to the states. The act 
required nearly complete state conformity with the federal tax base.191 
As a result, the only significant income tax policy choice that would 
remain with states opting into the program was how high to set their 
tax rates.192 Even though the states already substantially conformed 
their tax bases with that of the federal government, no state opted 
into the collection system, despite the significant administrative 
savings at stake.193 The act was repealed in 1990.194 Commentators 
offered a variety of observations to explain the utter failure of the 
legislation,195 but one clear drawback was the act’s requirement of 
complete conformity with the federal tax base.196 
This Part argues that the ability of the states to decouple their 
tax regimes from particular federal tax provisions crucially safeguards 
state tax autonomy and significantly mitigates the other disadvantages 
of tax-base conformity identified in Part III, while at the same time 
allowing states to secure most of the administrative benefits of 
conformity. 
Although the ability to decouple from the federal tax law 
preserves state tax autonomy, this Part explains that incorporating 
states do not have complete flexibility to deviate from the federal tax 
law. First, the costs of deviation—including administrative and 
political costs—limit the extent to which the states can deviate from 
federal law. In addition, as a practical matter, certain federal tax rules 
are not subject to deviation. For example, although it may be 
 
 190. Federal-State Tax Collection Act, Pub. L. No. 92-512, tit. II, 86 Stat. 936 (1972), 
repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XI, 
§ 11801(a)(45), 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). For a discussion of the history, advantages, and 
disadvantages of the act, see generally Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1. 
 191. See Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at 75–92 (describing conformity requirements and 
limited exceptions). 
 192. See id. at 77. 
 193. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02[2] (Supp. 2003). 
 194. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XI, subtit. H, pt. 
I, subpt. A, § 11801(a)(45), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388–522 (1990); see also HELLERSTEIN & 
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 (Supp. 2003). 
 195. The law required states to allow the IRS to represent them in all tax enforcement 
disputes, civil and criminal, so another concern among states was that the federal government 
would be insufficiently zealous in pursuing state revenue claims. Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at 
89.  
 196. Id. at 113–25 (discussing loss of state autonomy as an “oft-stated objection to the 
federal collection system”). 
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practical for states to deviate from the federal home mortgage 
deduction, it is not practical to deviate from the federal realization 
rule, because the realization rule cannot easily be severed from the 
rest of the federal tax base. Because whether a federal rule is 
severable is determined by its degree of entrenchment in federal law, 
rather than by normative criteria, it is reasonable to conclude that at 
least some nonseverable federal tax rules are undesirable from the 
perspective of state taxation. As a result, conforming states 
incorporate at least some federal tax policies that do not work well 
for them and that state voters would not choose for themselves. Thus, 
although the ability of states to decouple from federal tax provisions 
constitutes a powerful federalism safeguard, it does not fully mitigate 
the disadvantages of conformity. 
A. Full and Partial Decoupling 
No law requires states to conform to the federal tax base. Nor 
must a state that rejects conformity necessarily take on the legislative 
and administrative burden of autonomously enacting and maintaining 
an income tax. Instead, states can raise tax revenue from other 
sources, such as property and sales taxes.197 That nine states have no 
comprehensive personal income tax shows that it is possible for at 
least some states to function without significant income taxation.198 
Over time, however, states’ reliance on income taxation has grown as 
a percentage of overall state and local tax receipts, which suggests 
that states will find it increasingly difficult to raise all the revenue 
they need from other tax bases.199  
In addition to the nine states without comprehensive income 
taxes, another six states assess comprehensive income taxes but do 
not use federal AGI or federal taxable income as their starting point 
for calculating income.200 As discussed earlier, however, these facially 
 
 197. Exclusive of local taxation, in fiscal year 2008, states raised 28 percent of their revenue 
from income taxes, including both individual and corporate taxes. See TAX POLICY CTR., supra 
note 12, at 3. Income taxes do not represent a significant source of revenue for most localities. 
See JEFFREY L. BARNETT & PHILLIP M. VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT FINANCES SUMMARY: 2010, at 6 tbl.A-1 (2012), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/estimate/summary_report.pdf (displaying data showing that the 
substantial majority of local revenue derives from entities such as higher education institutions 
and hospitals, property taxes, and sales and gross receipts taxes). 
 198. See supra note 18. 
 199. See supra note 6.  
 200. The six states are Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Mississippi, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania. OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14, 16, 27, 36, 41, 49.  
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nonconforming states substantially conform to the federal tax base.201 
The use by even facially nonconforming states of federal income tax 
concepts reflects the prohibitive costs of devising a fully autonomous 
income tax base.202 This should not be surprising when we consider 
that the federal Internal Revenue Code is two thick volumes 
containing over 3.7 million words,203 and the Treasury regulations that 
interpret them fill an additional six volumes. 
States that judge it infeasible to decouple fully from the federal 
tax base nevertheless can—and do—deviate from particular 
provisions of the federal tax law.204 States can accomplish this 
deviation at any time by a simple act of the state legislature. 
Deviations take a variety of forms. “Additions,” or “add-backs,” 
enlarge the state tax base compared to the federal tax base because 
they require that the taxpayer add back an item of income that she 
excluded or deducted at the federal level. If the addition is an item 
separately stated on the federal tax form, such as the deduction for 
IRA contributions or the deduction for student-loan interest 
payments,205 then the state deviation will not significantly increase 
taxpayer compliance burdens.206 In contrast, when states add back 
items that are not separately stated on federal forms,207 compliance 
and enforcement costs increase. Deviations also may reduce state-
taxable income as compared to federally taxable income. Like 
additions, such “subtractions” can be items separately stated on 
 
 201. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text; see also HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, 
supra note 8, ¶ 7.02[3] (Supp. 2007) (explaining that such states also “largely follow the federal 
provisions” for corporate taxation).  
 202. Such costs include the expectations by state taxpayers that the state income tax base 
will (substantially) match the federal base.  
 203. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 n.6 (2008), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/08_tas_exec_summ0108v2.pdf. 
 204. See, e.g., Mark A. Muntean, California’s Nonconforming Conformity Legislation, 39 ST. 
TAX NOTES 259, 259 (2006) (noting that California’s tax law “includes nearly 50 pages of 
nonconforming provisions in the form of exceptions to the IRC”).  
 205. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1040, at 1 l. 32 (2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf (providing for IRA contribution deduction); id. at 1      
l. 33 (providing for student-loan interest deduction).  
 206. Cf. Pomp, supra note 48, at 1201 (labeling the state practice of requiring the same 
information as federal tax returns as “facial/recordkeeping conformity”); id. at 1205 (arguing 
that “provisions that violate facial/recordkeeping conformity should be suspect . . . and can be 
justified only if their resulting benefits are clear and substantial”). 
 207. For example, although interest on state and local bonds is federally exempt, most states 
require residents to add back interest earned on out-of-state bonds, a figure that appears 
nowhere on the federal tax form. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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federal forms,208 or not.209 Tax credits provide another mechanism for 
deviation. Although many states conform at least partially with 
federal tax credits,210 most states offer tax credits of their own 
design.211 
B. Mitigating Role of Decoupling 
A few state tax deviations are constitutionally required,212 but 
most deviations reflect state preferences and policy goals. The ability 
of states to deviate from individual provisions of the federal tax law 
distinguishes federal-state tax-base conformity from other 
intergovernmental cooperative mechanisms that raise more serious 
democratic accountability concerns, such as conditional grants or 
delegations of authority to supranational organizations.213 As this 
Section explains, deviations represent an important safeguard that 
 
 208. For example, many states allow residents to subtract pensions from their state-taxable 
incomes. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 5. Such pensions are federally taxable and 
separately stated on Form 1040, page 1, line 16. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 205, 
at l l. 16. 
 209. For example, some states offer tax preferences for qualified college-savings programs 
other than (or in addition to) federal I.R.C. § 529 college-savings plans. See, e.g., 35 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/203(a)(2)(D-20) (West 2012) (excluding distributions from the Illinois Prepaid 
Tuition Trust Fund, while requiring taxpayers to add back into income the return on federal § 
529 plans); N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(c)(32) (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2013) (providing exclusion 
under New York tax law of distributions from qualified New York college-savings plans). 
Because these amounts are not federally deductible (or excludable), they involve separate 
record-keeping obligations for state taxpayers. 
 210. When states conform to a federal tax credit, they typically do so by offering state 
taxpayers a percentage of the federal credit. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 62, § 6(h) 
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012) (providing against Massachusetts tax due a credit of 15 percent 
of the taxpayer’s federally calculated earned income tax credit). 
 211. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that the most common state tax credits 
include credits for taxes paid to other states, energy and environmental credits, jobs and 
business credits, child- and dependent-care credits, low-income credits, elderly and disabled 
credits, earned income tax credits, and credits for property taxes, rent payments or homesteads). 
 212. For example, states cannot tax federal obligations without congressional permission. 
See Pomp, supra note 48, at 1207 n.24. Likewise, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
dormant foreign Commerce Clause to prevent states from using their tax systems to 
discriminate against foreign commerce, even if the discriminatory provision was incorporated 
from federal law. See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 74, 
82 (1992) (holding that Iowa’s method of calculating corporate dividends-received-deductions 
(DRDs) violated the dormant Commerce Clause because, like the federal DRD, it denied the 
deduction to dividends received from non-U.S. corporations). 
 213. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 123 (concluding that some delegations to supranational 
organizations are de facto irrevocable because “the only way to opt out of one of [the 
supranational body’s] enactments is to opt out of the entire apparatus, with potentially 
disastrous economic and diplomatic consequences”).  
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mitigates some of the disadvantages of conformity raised in Part III. 
Specifically, the ability of states to deviate from federal tax provisions 
helps preserve state autonomy and regulatory diversity, may improve 
political accountability, allows states to tailor tax incentives to local 
conditions, and provides states a method to reduce the revenue 
volatility associated with conforming to the ever-changing federal tax 
base. Although deviations from the federal tax base (or from federal 
filing statuses) increase state taxpayers’ compliance costs and states’ 
administrative and enforcement costs, every state deviates somewhat 
from the federal tax base. 
1. State Autonomy and Regulatory Diversity.  Decoupling helps 
preserve state autonomy and regulatory diversity. A state’s ability to 
remove particular federal tax provisions from its own tax base does 
much to assuage the concern that federal-state tax-base conformity 
substitutes national for state political preferences regarding the 
content of the tax base. For example, earlier I recounted some of the 
objections to the federal exemption of imputed income from 
homeownership, including that it inequitably favors homeowners over 
renters.214 Several states provide a renters’ credit that attempts to 
balance the federal tax preference for owner-occupied housing.215 
Similarly, many states provide credits that expand or alter other 
federal tax preferences. For example, by granting tax credits (rather 
than itemized deductions) for charitable contributions, North 
Carolina avoids the unfairness attributed to the federal deduction for 
charitable contributions, which benefits only itemizers.216 
State tax deviations also reflect diversity in preferences among 
the voters of different states. For example, many states use tax credits 
to encourage parents to work outside the home, including by allowing 
employers to credit expenses related to providing child-care facilities 
to their employees,217 allowing parents and guardians to credit child-
care costs incurred while at work,218 and providing credits to two-
 
 214. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.  
 215. See e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17053.5(a)(1) (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 235-55.7(b) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 216. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-151.26 (West 2011). 
 217. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14–57 (showing that fourteen states credited 
employers’ child-care expenses in 2008). 
 218. See id. (showing that twenty-two states credited parents’ and guardians’ child-care 
expenses in 2008). 
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earner households.219 In contrast, Utah provides a tax credit for stay-
at-home parenting.220 The content of these tax incentives reflect 
differences in the values of the residents of different states. 
States even deviate from structural provisions of the federal tax 
law when those structural provisions clash with the values of state 
residents. For example, states that recognize same-sex marriages or 
same-sex domestic partnerships deviate from the federal practice of 
denying same-sex couples the ability to file joint tax returns.221 
2. Accountability.  The option to decouple from the federal tax 
base also mitigates the concern that tax-base conformity undermines 
political accountability by causing voters improperly to blame state 
legislators for federal-level tax policy choices. When individual 
provisions of the federal tax law can be incorporated—or not—into 
the state tax base on an item-by-item basis, it is appropriate for state 
voters to hold state legislators to account for the items that state 
legislators choose to incorporate, as well as those they choose to leave 
out. In this respect, we can distinguish tax-base conformity from 
conditional grants, which may be offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, 
and from federal commandeering, which gives states no choice 
whatsoever.222 
The requirement that state residents calculate their state-taxable 
income using separate tax forms also lessens accountability problems 
 
 219. See id. at 46–57 (showing that four states credited two-earner households in 2008). 
 220. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-1005 (LexisNexis 2011) (providing tax credit for “[a]t-
home parent[s]” who care for their own infant in their own home, and stating that the “[a]t-
home” parent’s earned income must not exceed $3000 for the year). 
 221. Kevin McCormally, Tax Savings for Domestic Partners: Seven States and the District of 
Columbia Now Allow Same-Sex Couples To File Joint Returns, KIPLINGER (Jan. 2009), 
http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/2008/01/domestic-partner-joint-tax-returns.html; see 
also OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that in 2009, six states allowed registered 
domestic partners or civil-union partners to elect whether to file jointly or separately). 
 222. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. Some commentators argue that it is 
perfectly appropriate for state voters to hold state representatives accountable for the terms of 
conditional grants because state legislators accept the conditions attached to grants. These 
commentators presumably also would conclude that state legislators should be held to account 
for the decision to conform the state tax base with the federal tax base. See, e.g., Roderick M. 
Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense 
and “Dual-Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 825–27, 860 (1998) (noting that it is 
difficult for voters to determine whether federal or state legislators are responsible for grant 
conditions, but that “individual states decide whether to accept the conditions and apply for the 
funds” (emphasis omitted)).  
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arising from federal-state tax-base conformity.223 The presence of two 
separate sovereigns, each assessing taxes separately using its own 
forms, helps to alert taxpayers to the fact that federal officials are 
responsible for the federal tax base, while state officials are 
responsible for the state tax base. 
3. Targeting Tax Incentives.  When national tax measures are not 
suitable to local conditions, states can deviate from the federal tax 
base by removing a federal tax provision or adding a new state 
provision. For example, as noted above, most states provide energy or 
environmental tax incentives tailored to local conditions.224 Tailored 
tax incentives include Arizona’s tax credits for water conservation 
and installation of certain solar energy devices.225 These credits reflect 
Arizona’s specific climate and geology. By providing tax incentives 
for solar energy, Arizona can target its subsidy to an alternative 
energy source likely to be especially effective in Arizona, whereas 
because federal alternative energy incentives must be targeted more 
broadly, they may subsidize Arizonans’ expenditures on alternative 
energy solutions that are less effective than solar energy in Arizona. 
States also can use deviations to meet state public health and 
safety concerns. For example, beginning in 2000, Oklahoma allowed a 
tax credit to restaurants that provided hepatitis A vaccinations to 
their employees.226 The vaccination credit was one strategy in a public-
health campaign that helped move Oklahoma from having one of the 
highest incidences of hepatitis A in the nation to having an incidence 
below the national average.227 Similarly, tax credits in Massachusetts 
 
 223. The separate reporting approach taken in the United States could be contrasted with 
the approach taken by other federal systems, such as Canada, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, 
in which the federal government collects the state income tax and remits it to the subnational 
government units. See Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at 70 (noting that the Canadian collection 
system requires strict provincial conformity with the federal tax, but that provinces can opt out 
of the federal collection scheme). Under such an assessment regime, state residents would 
presumably be more likely to blame or reward federal lawmakers for the content of the tax 
base. 
 224. See supra Part III.B.4; see also Evelyn Kim, Are State Green Tax Incentives Good 
Environmental and Tax Policy?, 45 ST. TAX NOTES 29 (2007) (noting that thirty-eight states 
provide energy or environmental credits).  
 225. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1090.01 (2006 & Supp. 2012) (providing tax credits for the 
installation of water-conservation systems); see also supra note 156. 
 226. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2357.33 (West 2008 & Supp. 2013). 
 227. From 1995 to 2000 Oklahoma had a very high incidence of hepatitis A, usually either 
the highest or in the top five of U.S. states. See DANNI DANIELS, SCOTT GRYTDAL & 
ANNEMARIE WASLEY, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SURVEILLANCE FOR ACUTE VIRAL 
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and Rhode Island for residential lead-paint abatement reflect special 
public health concerns that arise from older housing stock.228 Thus, 
state tax deviations enable states to tailor tax incentives or tax relief 
to local conditions.229 
4. Fiscal Stability.  Decoupling also allows states to minimize 
revenue shocks associated with substantive changes in the federal tax 
law. It is not uncommon for states to deviate from new federal 
legislation that narrows the tax base (as opposed to new federal 
legislation that expands the tax base). For example, in the period 
from 2002 to 2008 when states faced serious budget shortfalls, they 
were significantly less likely to incorporate new federal corporate tax 
expenditures.230 State deviations from federal tax cuts and federal tax 
expenditures allow states to increase or maintain revenue levels 
without having to raise tax rates explicitly. That state deviation from 
the federal tax base may also increase (rather than only decrease) 
state revenue also serves to distinguish tax-base conformity from 
other intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that raise federalism 
concerns, such as conditional grants, under which a state’s failure to 
accede to federal conditions results in revenue losses for that state. 
C. Entrenchment 
This Section identifies some of the principal barriers to federal 
tax base deviation, including procedural obstacles, increased 
administrative and compliance costs, and political risks associated 
with the high political salience of deviations. These and other factors 
raise the costs of deviation, including for provisions that a state easily 
can sever from the rest of the federal tax base. Additionally, some 
aspects of the federal tax law are what I call nonseverable; they are so 
 
HEPATITIS—UNITED STATES, 2007, at 12 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/
ss5803.pdf.  
 228. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 62, § 6(e) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
44-30.3-1 (2010). 
 229. Likewise, the tax incentives provided by many states for specific kinds of disaster relief 
and assistance reflect the greater incidence in these states of those natural disasters. See, e.g., 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2357.29 (West 2008) (providing credit for property damaged by a 
tornado occurring on May 8 or 9, 2003).  
 230. Morrow & Ricketts, supra note 174, at 29–33; see also LeAnn Luna & Ann B. Watts, 
Federal Tax Legislative Changes and State Conformity, 47 ST. TAX NOTES 619, 624 (2008) 
(finding that as state unemployment rises, so do state deviations from the federal corporate tax 
base); id. (explaining states’ goal to “protect their ever eroding tax bases” by decoupling from 
federal corporate tax preferences).  
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entrenched that it is impractical for states to deviate from them, even 
if states would be willing to bear the other associated costs of 
deviation. For example, because the realization requirement informs 
so much of the federal income calculation, incorporating states cannot 
sever it from the rest of the federal tax base.231 As this Section 
explains, there is no necessary connection between the normative 
desirability of a federal tax provision and its severability from the 
federal income tax base. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that states 
incorporate some nonseverable federal tax provisions from which 
they would prefer to deviate. 
1. Stickiness of the Federal Tax Base.  This subsection identifies 
factors, such as increased compliance costs and political obstacles, 
that might discourage a state from deviating from federal income tax 
rules, even when it is in the state’s interest to deviate. These factors 
tend to make federal tax provisions “stick” at the state level, 
notwithstanding states’ formal ability to deviate from them. 
Disharmony Costs.  Fear of eroding the benefits of vertical 
harmonization discussed in Part II may discourage a state from 
deviating from federal tax provisions. For example, deviations 
between the federal and state tax bases generate compliance costs for 
taxpayers. Although taxpayer return-preparation software lowers 
compliance costs associated with deviations, such software does not 
alleviate duplicative record-keeping requirements or planning 
burdens. Deviation also imposes costs on the deviating state. Devising 
and enforcing deviations requires the expenditure of scarce state 
legislative resources, and it increases state tax enforcement costs by 
reducing states’ ability to free ride on federal administration and 
enforcement. Deviation also increases administrative and judicial 
costs because states must interpret and enforce any deviations and 
adjudicate taxpayer disputes without the opportunity to rely on 
federal interpretations and adjudications. Notice also that a state’s 
ease of deviation varies with its resources. California may have the 
resources to administer a deviation that North Dakota could not. 
Deviations also compromise the horizontal harmonization 
benefits of tax-base conformity. For example, deviations could trigger 
a competitive race to the bottom in which each state tries to attract 
mobile residents by offering them expensive tax benefits. Deviations 
 
 231. For discussion of the realization rule, see supra notes 86–87. 
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also promote tax arbitrage while at the same time impeding interstate 
commerce by increasing tax compliance costs and the risk of 
unrelieved double taxation for multistate taxpayers. 
Information Gaps.  Information gaps contribute to the costs of 
deviation. For example, state legislators and voters simply may not be 
aware of or understand the impact on their state of each incorporated 
federal tax provision. Despite the implementation of heuristics 
(including the federal tax expenditure budget) that seek to highlight 
the regulatory impact of federal tax subsidies,232 the federal tax code is 
voluminous and complicated, and no state legislator or voter can be 
expected to understand all impacts of conforming to the federal tax 
base. As the rate of change to the federal tax law accelerates, these 
information problems become more acute.233 Overwhelmed with 
information about federal law, state legislators and voters simply may 
prefer to continue to conform, rather than conduct a detailed cost-
benefit analysis to determine which federal tax provisions harm the 
state. 
Signaling.  State deviations from the federal tax base send signals 
to taxpayers and others. In some cases, states send strategic signals 
through tax-base deviation. For example, when a state deviates from 
the federal tax base by exempting pension, retirement, and Social 
Security income, it sends the message that it is an attractive place to 
retire.234 Likewise, when states deviate from federal tax rules by 
 
 232. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2006), requires annual 
publication of a list of federal tax expenditures, defined by the Act as “provisions of the Federal 
tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which 
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” The purpose of 
the tax expenditure budget is to identify, estimate, and highlight spending through the tax law. 
For more on the tax expenditure budget, see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION ON TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX 
EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES 2–3 (2011) (providing explanation and history of tax expenditure 
analysis). 
 233. Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing 
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 914–23 (1987) (describing historical work by 
Professor Jon Witte that shows that changes to the federal tax law have consistently accelerated 
since the introduction of the income tax in the early twentieth century); see also id. at 945–53 
(attributing the increasing rate of tax change to changes in the federal legislative landscape, such 
as lower incumbency rates both in Congress generally and on tax-writing committees). 
 234. In contrast with the federal practice of taxing up to 85 percent of Social Security 
benefits, most states have deviating tax laws that completely exempt Social Security payments. 
See SNELL, supra note 34, at 2–3 (showing that most states completely exempt Social Security 
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allowing same-sex couples to file joint returns, they signal their 
commitment to marriage equality. 
In addition to sending positive signals, state tax deviations also 
may send negative signals. An analogy with contract default rules will 
illustrate. In a 2006 article, Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and John 
Pottow analyzed instances in which different jurisdictions have 
mutually exclusive contract default rules.235 They hypothesized that if 
one of the defaults were more efficient than the other, then 
contracting parties in the jurisdiction with the less efficient default 
should systematically contract around it.236 Instead, when they studied 
actual contracts, Professors Ben-Shahar and Pottow found that 
parties in each jurisdiction tended to stick to that jurisdiction’s 
default.237 To explain this puzzle, Professors Ben-Shahar and Pottow 
argued that a party to a contract might not suggest deviating from the 
default rule, even when the deviation would be favorable to both 
parties, because the very act of suggesting a deviation might 
“dissuade his potential counterparty from entering into the 
agreement.”238 In short, the party would avoid even efficient 
deviations for fear of signaling that he was trying to trick his 
counterparty by using a nonstandard term.239 
Professor Kathryn Spier also suggests that contracting parties 
may stick to default rules or boilerplate contract terms to avoid 
sending negative signals.240 She argues that if, for example, 
professional sports employment contracts typically do not contain 
injury clauses, a player would not suggest including one in exchange 
for a wage reduction for fear of signaling to the team that he has a 
higher-than-average risk of injury.241 Professors Ben-Shahar and 
Pottow go further and argue that if the default flipped, so that sports 
 
income, while of the fifteen that tax it, only seven follow the federal practice of taxing as much 
as 85 percent of it).  
 235. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 651, 675–78 (2006) (considering several default rules, including at-will versus for-
cause employment).  
 236. Id. at 672. 
 237. See id. at 675–78.  
 238. Id. at 652. 
 239. See id. (“The fear is that the counterparty will suspect that the proposer’s decision to 
deviate from the norm and use an unfamiliar provision hides some unknown problem: in short, 
that it is a ‘trick.’”).  
 240. Id. at 657 (citing Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. 
ECON. 432 (1992)). 
 241. Id.  (citing Spier, supra note 240). 
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employment contracts typically included an injury clause, the player 
still would not suggest that the clause should be dropped in exchange 
for a wage increase, lest he signal to the team that he intends to avoid 
risks and therefore will not truly be committed to winning.242 Thus, 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Pottow conclude that default rules might 
stick—regardless of their content—because contracting parties draw 
adverse inferences from requests to deviate.243 
Because state income tax bases are very complicated, most 
taxpayers rationally avoid analyzing them closely. Thus, state 
residents might not have a clear idea of the content of or motivation 
behind state tax-base deviations. But the very fact of state deviation 
may signal to residents and potential residents that the state is hiding 
something. Indeed, state deviations make it difficult for residents and 
potential residents to use the state’s tax rates in conjunction with their 
knowledge of the federal tax base to estimate their state tax liability. 
This asymmetry of information between the state and taxpayers may 
heighten taxpayers’ fear of exploitation or surprise, discouraging 
them from migrating to a state with a high incidence of deviations 
from the federal tax base.244 State tax deviations also might send 
negative signals about the characteristics of state government.245 For 
example, a high incidence of deviation might signal state officials’ 
disregard for added taxpayer compliance costs generated by 
deviation.246 Thus, to avoid situations in which taxpayers draw 
negative inferences from tax-base deviations, states may avoid or 
minimize such deviations.247 
 
 242. Id. at 662. 
 243. Id. at 682. 
 244. Cf. id. at 664 (“[D]isinclinations toward deviance stem from a rudimentary fear of the 
unknown.”); id. at 666 (noting that in experiments in which “adversaries (or even 
experimenters) are perceived to have more knowledge or competence in assessing the 
underlying risk probability,” decisionmakers “tend to feel more anxious” and seek to avoid such 
situations).  
 245. Lisa Bernstein and Alan Schwartz have separately suggested that deviation from 
standard contract terms may signal litigiousness to counterparties. Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms 
and Default Rules Analysis, 3. S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 71–72 (1993); Alan Schwartz, The 
Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for 
Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 397 (1990). 
 246. Cf. L.L. Ecker-Racz, Tax Simplification in This Federal System, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 769, 774 (1969) (concluding in the late 1960s that “compassion for taxpayers” was 
overcoming states’ “reluctance” to conform to the federal tax base). 
 247. States may acquiesce to a large number of low-dollar-value federal tax expenditures if 
the cost of deviating from any one such expenditure is not worth sending the adverse signal. 
Collectively, such provisions may amount to significant revenue losses and have significant 
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States also might want to avoid deviations that would reveal 
hidden information to other relevant parties, such as members of 
Congress. For example, if a state’s congressional delegation 
supported a federal-level tax benefit, the state’s failure to incorporate 
that benefit into the state tax base may reveal to other members of 
Congress that the benefit was less important to the state than its 
federal representatives claimed. For example, federal law provides 
tax incentives to the film industry, incentives that California’s federal 
congressional representatives presumably favored. However, when 
assessing its income tax, California deviates from those film-industry 
tax incentives.248 California’s nonconformity with federal tax 
incentives that disproportionately benefit California may undermine 
claims made by the state’s federal representatives that such incentives 
are needed in the federal tax base to support the film industry. 
Political Obstacles.  Political obstacles may make it difficult for 
incorporating states to deviate from the federal tax base. Some of 
these obstacles are structural. For example, states that dynamically 
incorporate federal law have no opportunity to deviate from new 
federal laws until the state legislature is in session, which may result 
in considerable time lags before deviation. Likewise, because some 
states require supermajority votes to raise taxes, once they 
incorporate federal tax preferences into state law, it may be difficult 
for states to deviate from them.249  
The endowment effect also may increase the political costs 
associated with state tax-base deviations. The endowment effect is the 
tendency of people to ascribe more value to objects or entitlements 
 
regulatory impacts. But deviating from many federal provisions probably sends a worse signal 
than deviating from just a few.  
 248. See, e.g., Muntean, supra note 204, at 260 (expressing surprise that California did not 
conform to federal-level tax preferences for the movie industry). California’s nonconformity 
with federal legislation is less surprising considering that such federal legislation accomplishes a 
wealth transfer from residents of all the other states to the movie industry of California. 
Although California’s federal representatives would clearly favor such a transfer, it is not clear 
that California’s state representatives would want to replicate that national transfer of wealth 
within California, because at the state level, the transfer would be from all California residents 
to California residents who are part of the movie industry. 
 249. See David Gamage & Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Managing Fiscal Volatility by Redefining 
Tax Cuts and Tax Hikes, 58 ST. TAX NOTES 113, 122–23 (2010) (discussing supermajority 
requirements); id. at 122 (noting that, due to the need for legislation to pass both legislative 
chambers and avoid veto by the governor, state law proposals “typically require the support of 
more than a mere 51 percent majority to become law”). This point suggests that once 
incorporated, provisions of the federal tax law will “stick” in the states.  
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that they possess than those that they do not possess.250 Experiments 
have confirmed that the endowment effect attaches not only to 
physical assets, but also to intangible entitlements.251 The federal tax 
base may generate endowment effects.252 For example, taxpayers who 
receive a federal tax benefit, such as the deduction for charitable 
donations, may come to feel entitled to that tax benefit, such that they 
value it more than the dollar amount of tax savings that it generates. 
This sense of entitlement would make the deduction difficult to 
repeal at the federal level. Similarly, if taxpayers regard the federal 
tax base as embodying a set of good practices to which most states 
conform, it could create the expectation that the same tax benefits 
should be available at the state level.253  
Even if state residents do not regard the federal tax base as 
embodying a set of good practices, such that they did not initially 
expect the state tax base to match the federal tax base, once states 
incorporate federal tax benefits, the endowment effect would make it 
more difficult politically for state legislators to drop those benefits in 
the future. The endowment effect therefore could make federal tax 
preferences sticky for incorporating states, even if the application of a 
federal tax benefit in a particular state is inefficient or poorly tailored, 
and even if its initial incorporation was by chance, for convenience, or 
because the state failed to conduct a thorough cost-benefits analysis 
of the federal tax benefit before incorporating it. Thus, once 
incorporated, federal tax benefits might stick without respect to 
whether they are efficient at the state level. Moreover, the 
 
 250. Daniel Kahneman and fellow researchers conducted a famous experiment in which 
college students who were given a mug demanded a higher price to sell it, on average, than did 
college students who were given six dollars instead of a mug and asked how much they would 
pay for the mug. The difference in the selling price for mug owners compared to the buying 
price for mug non-owners provides evidence of the endowment effect. See Daniel Kahneman, 
Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329–34 (1990). 
 251. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 608, 625–47 (1998) (conducting experiments involving contract default rules and reviewing 
evidence from experiments involving investment-portfolio allocations, job benefits, and 
electricity service); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 
113–14 (2002) (summarizing his experiment showing that the endowment effect attaches to 
vacation time).  
 252. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1035 (2011) 
(positing that the endowment effect applies to current tax benefits).  
 253. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 251, at 109 n.11 (noting in the default rules context that 
“[s]ocial scientists have yet to sort out the relationship between this legitimating effect and the 
endowment effect”). 
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endowment effect might help explain why states like Arizona and 
Georgia have adopted their own tailored environmental tax credits in 
addition to, rather than as a substitute for, federal green tax 
preferences.254 
Another reason state legislators may avoid deviating from 
federal tax benefits is that the high political salience of such 
deviations makes them politically risky. Most state taxpayers 
probably learn about the content of their state’s deviations from the 
federal tax base through their experience filling out state tax forms. 
To undo a federal tax benefit, such as an exemption or deduction, a 
state must employ an add-back, or addition. Specifically, the state 
must instruct the taxpayer to increase her state tax or taxable income 
by the amount of the federal benefit. This procedure calls taxpayers’ 
attention to precisely what they are losing through the state deviation. 
Even taxpayers who do not suffer an increase in state-taxable income 
due to the add-back (for example, because they did not qualify for the 
federal benefit) may perceive the state to be taking away upside 
potential.255 Deviation from a federal tax benefit therefore may be 
framed as a tax increase, even if the state never adopted the federal 
tax benefit in the first place. In contrast, if state legislators devised the 
state income tax base from a blank slate, taxpayers would be unlikely 
to consider all of the possible exemptions and deductions that their 
state could grant, but does not. That is, if states worked from a blank 
slate, inconsistencies between the state and federal tax bases would 
not be framed as state tax increases. 
The inability to deviate quietly from the federal tax base could 
explain why some states have chosen not to incorporate federal law. 
For example, Pennsylvania is a facially nonconforming state; it does 
not expressly incorporate either federal AGI or federal taxable 
 
 254. Arizona has deviating tax credits to support solar energy and Georgia has deviating 
credits to reduce air pollution. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 15 (indicating no Arizona 
deviations from federal environmental tax incentives, but noting credits for business investment 
in solar energy, water conservation, and electric-vehicle-recharge outlets); id. at 22 (indicating 
no Georgia deviations from federal environmental tax incentives, but noting state-level 
environmental tax credits for, inter alia, diesel-particulate emission-reduction equipment, 
electric-vehicle chargers, and low-emission vehicles). 
 255. Arguably, a state taxpayer should be glad that her state does not incorporate federal 
tax preferences for which she does not qualify, given that state deviation from the benefit will 
tend to shift the state tax burden away from her and toward fellow state residents who qualified 
for the benefit at the federal level. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to conclude that instead 
such a voter would feel regret that she will not be able to take advantage of the deduction at the 
state level in a later year. 
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income as the starting point for its income calculations.256 However, its 
taxable base ends up looking like federal AGI minus federal above-
the-line deductions, such as those for IRA contributions, self-
employed health-insurance premiums, higher education expenses, 
teacher’s expenses, and student-loan interest.257 If, instead of enacting 
a facially nonconforming tax base, Pennsylvania used federal AGI 
and then required state taxpayers to add back the federal above-the-
line deductions, it would draw more attention to the fact that 
Pennsylvania disallows these benefits. Thus, the desire to obscure its 
broad income tax base may have motivated Pennsylvania’s legislature 
to reject explicit federal-state tax-base conformity.258 For states that 
do conform explicitly, however, the desire to avoid what might be 
called “noisy withdrawals” from federal tax benefits may reduce the 
incidence of deviation. 
In addition to making state tax deviations that claw back federal-
level tax benefits politically riskier, the heightened salience associated 
with state tax deviations may result in greater political rewards for 
deviations that taxpayers approve of. Thus, the high salience of 
deviating state tax benefits may explain why so many state deviations 
from the federal tax base take the form of tax benefits unavailable at 
the federal level.259 More generally, state voters may hold state 
legislators to account more for tax provisions that the state legislators 
specifically choose than for those they simply incorporate from the 
federal government.260 
2. Nonseverable Default Rules.  Even when state legislators and 
residents are willing to pay the political, administrative, financial, and 
 
 256.  See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
 257. See PA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, FORM PA-40, PENNSYLVANIA INCOME TAX RETURN 
FORM AND INSTRUCTIONS 1–2 (2010); see also OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 49 (describing 
the major differences between the federal tax base and the Pennsylvania tax base). 
 258. The text should not be understood as making an argument against broad income tax 
bases; on the contrary, most commentators advocate broadening the federal tax base. See 
generally Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A 
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) (advocating a 
broad tax base shorn of policy-motivated tax incentives). 
 259. See generally OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17. 
 260. Behavioral research finds support for the notion that people perceive action differently 
than inaction. See Korobkin, supra note 251, at 625 & nn.53–56 (citing behavioral experiments 
supporting the existence of the “status quo bias,” which is the notion that “people systematically 
favor maintaining a state of affairs that they perceive as being the status quo rather than 
switching to an alternative state, all else being equal”); id. at 657–60 (summarizing experiments 
suggesting that people perceive it to be easier to control actions than inactions). 
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other costs associated with deviations from the federal tax base 
described above, they still may not, as a practical matter, be able to 
deviate from certain federal tax policies. Some federal tax laws simply 
do not come à la carte; they are not severable from the rest of the 
federal tax base. I label these provisions “practically nonseverable.” 
They include many structural aspects of the federal tax law, such as 
annual reporting without income averaging,261 the realization rule, and 
the exclusion of imputed income.262 As discussed earlier, such 
structural aspects of the tax law may substantially impact efficiency 
and equity, but it would be difficult or impossible for states to benefit 
from federal tax-base conformity if they wanted to change such 
fundamental elements of the income tax calculation. Although 
nothing prohibits states from deviating from practically nonseverable 
provisions, the state tax base that would result from such deviations 
would be so different from the federal tax base that the state would 
substantially cede the benefits it derives from conformity. For 
example, if a state moved from the federal realization rule to even a 
partial mark-to-market tax regime—under which the requirement to 
mark-to-market could be limited to readily marketable assets whose 
value is easy to determine—the state would have to change significant 
aspects of its tax base as compared to the federal tax base.263 
Moreover, as the calculation of taxable income at the state level 
diverges from its calculation at the federal level, the state is able to 
rely less and less upon federal resources, including federal tax 
legislative drafting expertise, federal tax information collection, 
federal enforcement, and so on. 
Other elements of the federal tax law may be severable, but only 
at great administrative cost. For example, state deviation from federal 
 
 261. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. States could tax some, but not all, kinds 
of imputed income that presently go untaxed at the federal level. Whether states could 
effectively tax a particular item of imputed income depends on a variety of issues, including 
whether the state could easily determine the value of the imputed income. 
 263. Cf. Weisbach, supra note 87, at 103–21 (exploring some of the complexities that would 
be involved in moving to a partial mark-to-market (MTM) tax base at the federal level, 
including deciding which assets to subject to the MTM regime, addressing tax-avoidance 
opportunities created by subjecting some assets to an MTM rule while others remain subject to 
a realization rule, and deciding how to handle taxation of corporate profits). Any state seeking 
to move to an MTM regime would face the same challenges. These challenges would become 
more acute for a more complete MTM regime. See, e.g., Fred B. Brown, “Complete” Accrual 
Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1559, 1618–72 (1996) (considering MTM tax-base design 
issues). 
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depreciation rules will result in taxpayers having a different basis in 
the same asset for state and federal tax purposes, thereby increasing 
record-keeping costs and making enforcement more difficult.264 
Likewise, recall the same-sex marriage and immigration examples 
discussed earlier. The disparate federal treatment of same- and 
opposite-sex married couples is not limited to filing statuses.265 
Rather, much of the federal tax law depends on taxpayers’ marital 
status. For example, a word search of the Internal Revenue Code 
reveals that over two hundred Internal Revenue Code sections 
contain at least one of the following words: “spouse,” “husband,” 
“wife,” “married,” or “marriage.”266 DOMA affects federal income 
tax calculations by requiring such terms to be inapplicable to same-
sex married couples. Thus, to equalize treatment of same- and 
opposite-sex married couples, states would have to reinterpret federal 
tax code provisions to include same-sex couples and then recalculate 
same-sex couples’ income based on those reinterpretations. To excise 
every instance in the federal tax base of different treatment of same- 
and opposite-sex married couples would significantly increase 
compliance costs for same-sex married couples and substantially 
erode the administrative benefits of conformity.267  
Similarly, the favorable federal treatment of tax-resident aliens 
permeates the federal tax law.268 As discussed above, federal tax law 
recognizes only two categories of taxpayers: U.S. tax residents and 
U.S. tax nonresidents.269 The definition of U.S. tax resident includes 
not only all U.S. citizens and green card holders, but also any aliens 
who satisfy a physical presence test. As a result, citizens, green card 
holders, and other tax-resident aliens (whether documented or 
undocumented) receive nearly identical treatment under the federal 
tax law. To avoid incorporating tax advantages for undocumented 
immigrants into their own tax bases, states would either have to add 
 
 264. See DUNCAN, supra note 48, para. 7.4 (arguing that states find it “effectively 
impossible” not to conform to federal timing rules). 
 265. See supra notes 124–133 and accompanying text.  
 266. This search was performed on Title 26 of the U.S. Code in Westlaw. 
 267. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Some Tax Breaks Unavailable to Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. 
TIMES BUCKS BLOG, (Apr. 16, 2012 10:30 AM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/
some-tax-breaks-unavailable-to-same-sex-couples (describing burdens on same-sex married 
couples to create “dummy” joint federal tax returns to calculate their state income tax liability).  
 268. A word search of Title 26 of the U.S. Code on Westlaw reveals that over 250 Internal 
Revenue Code sections contain at least one of the following words: “alien,” “resident,” or 
“nonresident.”  
 269. See supra notes 134–140 and accompanying text.  
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exceptions for each federal tax expenditure provision they 
incorporate, or they would have to subdivide the “U.S. tax resident” 
category of federal taxpayers. Not only might such deviations raise 
federal preemption questions,270 but they also would seriously 
jeopardize the state’s ability to free ride on federal enforcement and 
interpretive efforts. 
As scholars have long recognized in the contracts context, 
immutable rules—those the parties cannot contract around—should 
have strong normative justifications.271 For example, immutable 
contract rules may be designed to protect third parties from the 
adverse effects of contracts. Immutable tax rules also should have 
strong normative justifications. Some nonseverable aspects of the 
federal tax law have a strong normative basis. For example, the 
federal tax law generally does not draw distinctions between 
taxpayers on the basis of race, sex, or national origin. But other 
nonseverable federal tax provisions have weaker normative support. 
For example, federal reliance on realization and annual filing without 
income averaging reflect administrative convenience,272 but they 
compromise the distributional fairness of the tax system. 
Unfortunately, the degree of severability of federal tax rules bears no 
necessary connection to their normative desirability. As a result, 
there is no reason to think that the nonseverable provisions of federal 
tax law are generally salutary or ones that the states ought to 
incorporate. For good or for ill, they simply come with conformity. 
VI.  EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite the disadvantages of tax-base conformity identified in 
Part III, it is unlikely that states will fully decouple their tax bases 
from that of the federal government. Indeed, several states consider 
dynamic conformity with federal tax law to be so important that their 
 
 270. An argument could be made that the federal government’s plenary power over 
immigration preempts state deviation from the federal tax treatment of tax-resident aliens. Cf. 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (invalidating on preemption grounds an 
Arizona statute that sought to discourage illegal immigration). 
 271. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989) (noting the scholarly consensus 
that immutable rules are those whose violation would be “socially deleterious”). 
 272. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. 
REV. 355, 355 (2004) (“There is a strong consensus [that] . . . a realization requirement is . . . 
necessary due to the liquidity and valuation constraints of accrual taxation.”); see also 
BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 179, at 1205 (“[A]n income averaging system would likely 
be very complicated . . . .”). 
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constitutions specifically permit it.273 And over time, more and more 
states have adopted conforming tax bases.274 That only six states with 
comprehensive income taxes do not practice explicit federal base 
conformity reflects the judgment by state legislators that the benefits 
of base conformity outweigh its costs. Only one state, Alaska, 
abandoned conformity after adopting it, and that state completely 
repealed its income tax.275 Assuming that federal-state tax-base 
conformity is here to stay, this Part has three goals. It recommends 
steps that the state and federal governments can take to reduce the 
adverse impact of conformity, it considers the implications of tax-base 
conformity for controversial tax policy issues, and it suggests avenues 
for future research that would take account of tax-base conformity. 
A. Policy Recommendations 
This Section makes policy recommendations to the states and the 
federal government for minimizing the disadvantages of federal-state 
tax-base conformity. 
1. State Governments. 
Publish Tax Expenditure Budgets.  To increase awareness among 
state voters and legislators of the regulatory impact of tax-base 
conformity, states should publish annual tax expenditure budgets. By 
drawing attention to the existence and cost of tax expenditures, such 
budgets would increase the accountability of all state tax 
expenditures, including those that the state imports from the federal 
government via base conformity. At present, data on the magnitude 
of state tax expenditures are difficult to obtain because not all states 
maintain reliable tax expenditure budgets, and some states do not 
maintain tax expenditure budgets at all.276 States cannot rely on 
 
 273. Without such provisions, dynamic incorporation of federal tax law could violate state 
constitutional prohibitions on delegation of legislative authority. See supra note 80. The 
constitutions of twelve states provide for dynamic incorporation of federal tax law. Dorf, supra 
note 3, at 110 n.14. 
 274. Cf. Hildreth et al., supra note 46, at 583–84 (finding that state corporate tax systems 
increased in conformity over the period spanning 1929 to 1989). 
 275. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 n.7 (Supp. 2003); Stolz & Purdy, 
supra note 1, at 116 & n.289; cf. Ecker-Racz, supra note 246, at 775 (“[N]o state that has once 
conformed its income tax base to the federal has subsequently abandoned it.”). 
 276. Several states with individual income taxes do not publish tax expenditure budgets, 
including Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming. JASON LEVITIS, NICHOLAS JOHNSON & JEREMY KOULISH, CTR. ON 
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estimates of federal tax expenditures alone because states also 
implement their own tax expenditures and because the impact of 
federal tax expenditures is not geographically uniform. 
Prefer Static (or Lagged) Incorporation to Dynamic 
Incorporation.  The choice between dynamic and static incorporation 
represents a trade-off between administrative convenience and 
control over the state tax base. Although nearly half of conforming 
states have already chosen static incorporation,277 the analysis 
presented in this Article suggests that more states should consider 
doing so. Through static incorporation, states can secure many of the 
advantages of tax-base conformity while avoiding the more serious 
revenue shocks and democratic losses caused by dynamic 
incorporation. Incorporating the federal tax base as it existed at a 
fixed point in time allows state officials the opportunity to analyze 
and debate the merits of new federal law before it becomes the law of 
the state. Likewise, tax revenues are more predictable when states 
elect to have a static tax base. 
States’ inability to deficit spend, coupled with their inability to 
adjust rates quickly to account for late-year federal tax changes, may 
explain why so many states eschew dynamic incorporation of federal 
tax law in favor of static incorporation, even though static 
incorporation increases compliance costs.278 In addition to increasing 
compliance costs, another drawback to static conformity is that 
statically conforming states must regularly amend their tax law to 
keep it aligned with federal law.279 Failure to do so would result in 
divergence between the state and federal tax base that would erode 
 
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, PROMOTING STATE BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH 
TAX EXPENDITURE REPORTING 5 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-9-09sfp.pdf 
(estimating that state tax expenditures “cost states tens, perhaps hundreds, of billions of dollars 
per year in forgone revenue”). Most states with individual income taxes publish tax expenditure 
budgets, although the data they provide is often incomplete. See id. at 1. 
 277. See DUNCAN, supra note 48, para. 3.4.3 (reporting that seventeen states have “fixed-
date” conformity). 
 278. See, e.g., Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at 120 & n.307 (describing how Oregon switched 
to static incorporation after federal base changes under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 
No. 1972, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), left it with a $30 
million revenue shortfall). 
 279. See Morrow & Ricketts, supra note 174, at 29 (summarizing a study of states’ decisions 
to conform or not with eleven major federal tax initiatives enacted from 2002 to 2008 and 
finding—to their surprise—“no differences between states whose tax systems require 
affirmative legislative action to decouple from tax changes implemented by the federal 
government and those that do not”).  
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the gains associated with conformity. As the New Jersey Supreme 
Court observed, “unless the Legislature may . . . provide suitably for 
the State’s immediate adoption of amendments to the federal laws 
and regulations, the State’s policy of uniformity would, as a practical 
matter, soon be defeated.”280 
To prevent significant divergence of state and federal tax bases 
over time, states could adopt lagged conformity, with a period of 
delay of one or two years to reflect state legislative rules, practices, 
and session schedules. Such lagged conformity would allow states to 
anticipate and plan for revenue volatility. It also would allow them to 
observe new federal tax policies in action before deciding whether to 
incorporate them. If newly incorporated federal tax incentives 
become entrenched due to loss aversion, then giving state legislatures 
more time to evaluate new federal tax incentives before incorporation 
could represent an important improvement in state fiscal 
responsibility. Of course, compared to dynamic incorporation, both 
lagged and static incorporation would increase state administrative 
costs and taxpayer compliance costs. 
Incorporate Federal AGI, Not Federal Taxable Income.  A 
federal taxpayer calculates her federal income tax liability by 
beginning with what might be called her “gross income less 
exclusions.”281 This figure represents the taxpayer’s “gross income” 
includable under § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code,282 less any 
excluded income. Items of gross income may be expressly excluded 
by federal statute or implicitly excluded by long-standing federal 
practice. For example, gifts and qualifying employer-paid health-
insurance premiums are excluded by federal statute, while federal 
practice has been to exclude imputed income. From the figure 
representing her gross income less exclusions, the taxpayer then 
subtracts her above-the-line deductions to arrive at AGI. From AGI, 
the taxpayer subtracts personal exemptions and standard or itemized 
deductions to arrive at her taxable income.283 Finally, she applies the 
 
 280. State v. Hotel Bar Foods, 112 A.2d 726, 732 (N.J. 1955). 
 281. The Form 1040 labels this figure “total income” on line 22, but the term “total income” 
does not appear in the Internal Revenue Code and therefore does not represent a term that 
states could incorporate into their own tax law. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 205, 
at 1 l. 22.  
 282. That is, her “gross income from whatever source derived.” I.R.C. § 61 (2006). 
 283. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 205, at 2 ll. 40–42. 
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federal tax rates to her taxable income to calculate her federal tax 
liability. Only then does she apply any available federal tax credits.284 
When states conform earlier in the federal income tax 
calculation, they tend to incorporate fewer regulatory federal tax 
provisions, whereas when states conform later in the calculation, they 
tend to incorporate more regulatory federal tax provisions. Thus, the 
point at which states conform to the federal income tax calculation 
matters. For example, states that conform with the federal definition 
of AGI import into state law federal exclusions and above-the-line 
deductions, but not federal itemized deductions. In contrast, states 
that conform with the federal definition of taxable income 
incorporate not only federal exclusions and above-the-line 
deductions, but also federal itemized deductions, many of which have 
regulatory goals.285 Thus, to minimize the disadvantages of tax-base 
conformity, states should incorporate the federal definition of AGI, 
rather than the federal definition of taxable income. 
Notice, however, that even if states conform with AGI, rather 
than taxable income, they cannot entirely avoid importing federal tax 
policies into their own tax bases because federal AGI reflects federal 
exclusions that may have regulatory effects.286 Excluded items of 
income, such as gifts or employer-paid health-insurance premiums, 
appear nowhere on a taxpayer’s federal Form 1040. The taxpayer 
simply omits reporting such income. Some of the most expensive 
 
 284. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.  
 285. Above-the-line deductions include, inter alia, deductions for qualified payments of 
educator expenses, moving expenses, self-employment taxes, self-employed health-insurance 
premiums, alimony, IRA contributions, student-loan interest, tuition and fees. See INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., supra note 205, at 1 ll. 23–37 (listing deductions from gross income whose 
subtraction yields “adjusted gross income” on line 37). Itemized deductions include, inter alia, 
qualified medical and dental expenses, state and local taxes, home mortgage interest, and gifts 
to charity. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,  SCHEDULE A (FORM 1040) (2012), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sa.pdf (requiring itemization of these deductions 
for reporting purposes). 
 286. There is no administrable point earlier than AGI at which states could conform with 
the federal calculation of income. Although the federal Form 1040 labels as “total income” the 
figure that I refer to as “gross income less exclusions,” the term “total income” is not defined by 
the Internal Revenue Code, and therefore it cannot easily be incorporated by reference into 
state law. Whereas the term “gross income” appears in § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, that 
amount appears nowhere on the federal tax form, and therefore it would not be an 
administratively convenient point of conformity.  
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federal tax expenditures are structured as exclusions, but it is difficult 
for incorporating states to deviate from them.287 
To reverse the effect of exclusions, states would have to direct 
taxpayers to add back excluded items of income. How difficult a task 
this would be for state taxpayers depends on federal (or other 
regulatory) reporting requirements for excluded items of income. 
Whereas certain items of excluded income, including employer-paid 
health-insurance premiums, may appear on taxpayers’ W-2 forms, 
other excluded items, such as gifts, may not be subject to any federal 
record-keeping requirements. It would be particularly difficult for 
states to use add-backs to include items of income that are federally 
excluded but not subject to federal reporting requirements. 
In contrast, because states conform with federal tax law by 
incorporating either federal AGI or federal taxable income, states do 
not automatically incorporate any federal tax credits. As a result, the 
default rule for federal tax credits is nonincorporation. This default is 
good from the perspective of preserving state autonomy, because tax 
credits, like above-the-line and itemized deductions, tend to be 
regulatory. 
Invoke the Political Safeguards of Federalism.  Defenders of 
conditional federal spending have argued that the “political 
safeguards of federalism” adequately protect state autonomy from 
federal encroachment, obviating the need for courts to review federal 
legislation to ensure that such legislation complies with the strictures 
of federalism. Under the political-safeguards theory, famously 
championed by Professor Herbert Wechsler, judicial enforcement of 
federalism is unnecessary because the states are fully capable of 
looking after their own interests in the political arena.288 Modern 
proponents of the political-safeguards theory argue that even though 
popular election of Senators has eroded the traditional political 
safeguards of federalism, new safeguards have arisen to replace them. 
For example, Professor Larry Kramer argues that political parties 
 
 287. Of the top ten federal tax expenditures by value, six are exclusions. See JOINT COMM. 
ON TAXATION, supra note 232, at 18 (listing among the top ten tax expenditures the exclusions 
for: capital gains at death, qualified pension contributions and earnings, employer contributions 
to medical insurance, Social Security Old-Age and Survivors Insurance benefits, unemployment 
benefits, and interest on life-insurance savings). 
 288. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 
(1954). 
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protect states from federal encroachment by tying the fates of state 
and national politicians.289 
Experience has shown that states can be effective at protecting 
their interests in the national political arena when it comes to 
taxation. For example, during the negotiations over what became the 
base-broadening federal Tax Reform Act of 1986,290 proposals were 
made to eliminate the federal deduction for payments of state and 
local taxes.291 The states successfully defeated the most aggressive 
version of the proposal, thereby ensuring that state and local income 
and property taxes would remain federally deductible.292 Likewise, 
when British tax-treaty negotiators secured a concession from U.S. 
treaty negotiators that would have limited states’ ability to impose 
worldwide unitary taxation against British companies with operations 
in the United States, states successfully lobbied the Senate to 
condition ratification of the treaty upon the requirement that the 
offending clause be read out of the treaty.293 States also can use 
preexisting organizations, such as the Multistate Tax Commission, to 
help formulate their responses to federal tax policies.294 The 
Multistate Tax Commission is an intergovernmental state tax agency 
charged with, among other tasks, facilitating assessment and 
collection of state taxes and promoting compatibility among the 
states’ tax systems.295 States also might arrange through the Multistate 
Tax Commission for collective deviation from federal tax provisions. 
Such collective action would counteract the risk that any particular 
state, by failing to conform, would send negative signals to state 
taxpayers. 
 
 289. See generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).  
 290. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). 
 291. See Jane G. Gravelle & Jennifer Gravelle, How Federal Policymakers Account for the 
Concerns of State and Local Governments in the Formulation of Federal Tax Policy, 60 NAT’L 
TAX J. 631, 631 (2007). 
 292. See id. 
 293. RICHARD E. ANDERSEN, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 
¶ 7.01[2][g] & n.49 (2011).  
 294. See Hildreth et al., supra note 46, at 577–78 (“The preservation of state sovereignty 
[was] not mentioned explicitly in the [Multistate Tax] Compact itself though it does appear in 
statements made by Commission members and in Commission publications . . . .”).  
 295. See MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, THE MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT art. I (1967). 
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2. Federal Government.  The discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages of tax-base conformity in this Article generates policy 
implications for the federal government as well as state governments. 
Calculate State Costs in Federal Tax Expenditure Budget.  One 
implication of the analysis in this Article is that the federal tax 
expenditure budget underestimates the total revenue losses 
associated with federal tax expenditures because the budget estimates 
only federal revenue losses.296 A more accurate tax expenditure 
budget also would estimate the revenue losses for conforming states. 
If the federal government undertook such estimates, it would relieve 
states of the burden of tax expenditure estimation, at least for tax 
expenditures incorporated from the federal tax base. 
Produce a Federal Tax Code Pocket Part.  The federal 
government also could generate a simple list of changes in the federal 
tax law each year, including both new tax provisions and repeals or 
expirations of existing provisions.297 The current tax expenditure 
budget could be used as the model for the list of changes.298 By 
identifying the changes in federal tax law from year to year, the 
federal government would assist state legislators and voters by 
focusing attention on whether the state should deviate from changes 
in federal tax policies. Thus, state legislators and state voters would 
read the list of changes in conjunction with the federal tax 
expenditure budget to help predict both the regulatory and revenue 
effects of tax-base conformity. These steps would not only aid state 
legislators, but they would also help federal legislators understand the 
impact of federal policies on the states. 
Consider the Impact of Federal Taxes on the States.  Congress 
also should explicitly consider the effect of proposed federal tax law 
changes on the states. For example, the expectation that states will, 
through incorporation, implement tax incentives identical to those 
 
 296. Likewise, federal outlay equivalent estimates for tax expenditures, which estimate how 
much the federal government would have to spend to convert federal tax expenditures to direct 
spending programs, also are inaccurate because they ignore the loss of matching state subsidies 
through conformity.  
 297. Of course, changes to federal tax law are already publicly available, but reducing such 
changes to a simple list, modeled on the federal tax expenditure budget, would make those 
changes more salient. 
 298. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
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provided at the federal level should factor into the size of federal 
subsidies. 
Additionally, Congress should adopt policies that seek to 
minimize the impact of federal tax law changes upon state revenues. 
For example, instead of narrowing the tax base to provide fiscal relief 
during recessions, Congress should prefer rate reductions. Under tax-
base conformity, federal base narrowing (but not federal rate 
reduction) impacts state tax revenues.299 States generally will find it 
politically easier to simply maintain their rates in the face of federal 
rate cuts than to raise their rates in response to narrowing of the 
federal tax base. In this way, Congress could help the states avoid 
fiscal crises.300 
Congressional contemplation of the impact of its income tax 
policy on the states in these ways would mark a clear change from 
current practice, under which “Congress regularly adopts changes to 
the Internal Revenue Code . . . with little or no consideration of the 
fiscal consequences for state and local governments.”301  
Consider Stealth Commandeering.  Alternatively, in some cases, 
federal lawmakers may consciously seek to exploit base conformity as 
a low-cost way of implementing federal policy at the state level. 
Because states incorporate most changes to the federal tax base, 
incorporation represents a cheap way for the federal government to 
influence state tax policy and to supplement the subsidies Congress 
offers through the federal tax system. It is also worth observing that, 
unlike conditional grants, changes to the federal tax base do not 
 
 299. In a written submission to President Bush’s Tax Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform, Harley Duncan of the Federation of Tax Administrators explained that although Bush 
administration changes to the federal corporate tax base provoked significant state deviations, 
federal changes to the individual tax base did not have as profound an effect because “the bulk 
of the federal revenue impacts were associated with the marginal tax rate reductions and the 
child tax credit, neither of which have an impact on states from a conformity standpoint.” 
DUNCAN, supra note 48, ¶ 3.5.4. 
 300. See Stark, supra note 1, at 408 (arguing that the federal government has an “interest in 
minimizing state fiscal crises”). Economists’ findings that failure of either level of government to 
consider the effect of its fiscal policies on the other level may lead to inefficiently high taxation 
provides further support for such a deliberative prescription. See Álex Esteller-Moré and Albert 
Solé-Ollé, Vertical Income Tax Externalities and Fiscal Interdependence: Evidence from the US, 
31 REG. SCI. & URB. ECON. 247, 250 (2001). 
 301. Stark, supra note 1, at 410; see also Luna & Watts, supra note 230, at 619 (“[T]he state 
budgetary impact of a federal change is seldom taken into account by Congress.”).  
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require Congress to transfer funds to the states,302 and because states 
retain the formal option to decouple from the federal tax base, 
congressional exploitation of tax-base conformity probably would not 
violate constitutional prohibitions on commandeering.303 
B. Implications for Perennial Tax Policy Debates 
This Section considers the implications of tax-base conformity 
for controversial tax policy issues, such as the appropriate structure 
and content of federal tax expenditures, the role of the federal 
deduction for state and local income taxes, whether Congress should 
employ legislative sunsets, and the desirability of federal consumption 
taxation. Rather than disposing of these debates, tax-base conformity 
considerations may further complicate them. 
1. Tax Expenditures Generally.  Commentators have long 
criticized the federal use of tax expenditures—especially those 
structured as deductions and exemptions—on the grounds that such 
tax expenditures are inequitable, inefficient, politically 
unaccountable, and add to the complexity of the tax law.304 The fact 
that federal-state tax-base conformity duplicates those disadvantages 
at the state level provides a new argument against using such tax 
expenditures to incentivize behavior. Moreover, incorporation of 
federal exemptions and deductions at the state level may introduce 
new inefficiencies. Under conformity with AGI or taxable income, 
the states effectively match federal subsidies structured as deductions 
or exemptions, but the amount of each state’s match varies with the 
state’s tax rate. For example, consider two taxpayers who each spend 
$100 in federally deductible home mortgage interest and who are 
both taxable at the highest marginal rate in their states. If one lives in 
 
 302. Through the federal deduction for state and local taxation, a portion of the cost of the 
state-level match of federal-level tax subsidies effectively would be charged back to the federal 
government. 
 303. See supra note 145. Under constitutionally permissible conditional grants, “[i]f a State’s 
citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests, they may elect to decline a 
federal grant,” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992), whereas under 
unconstitutional commandeering, “[a] State may not decline to administer the federal program. 
No matter which path the State chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress.” Id. at 176–77. 
 304. See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 258, at 705 (criticizing Congress for using the tax law to 
achieve nontax regulatory goals); see also Eric Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending—Does It Make a 
Difference?, TAX POLICY CTR. (June 8, 2000), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/
urlprint.cfm?ID=410261 (“By the usual standards of tax policy analysis, tax expenditures make 
the tax system worse according to the goals of fairness, efficiency, and simplicity.”).  
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California, a state that conforms to the federal mortgage-interest 
deduction, her state-level mortgage-interest deduction will be worth 
$10.30. In contrast, if the other lives just across the Colorado River in 
Arizona, which also conforms to the federal mortgage-interest 
deduction, her $100 deduction will be worth only $4.54.305 Varying 
subsidies by state tax rates only makes sense if elasticities also 
similarly vary with those rates. 
The federalism concerns raised by tax-base conformity also 
provide new arguments to support the position that, if the federal 
government will use tax expenditures at all, the preferred form of tax 
expenditures should be tax credits.306 First, unlike exemptions and 
deductions, whose value varies with state tax rates, tax credits have 
the same dollar value for all taxpayers. Second, because they come 
later in the tax-liability calculation than do exemptions or deductions, 
it is easier for incorporating states to sever federal tax credits than it 
is for states to sever federal exemptions or deductions. Indeed, 
because states conform to the federal definition of either AGI or 
taxable income, by default states do not incorporate any federal tax 
credits. Instead, incorporating a federal tax credit requires a special 
act of the state legislature. Congress therefore could improve the 
equity, efficiency, and autonomy of state tax systems by favoring tax 
credits over deductions and exemptions. Federal tax credits would be 
particularly appropriate when there are likely to be regional 
differences in relevant conditions, such that it would be efficient for 
some states to incorporate the federal tax incentive, but for others to 
reject it. 
2. The SALT Deduction in Particular.  Analysis of federal-state 
tax-base conformity also provides new insight into the justification for 
 
 305. The highest marginal tax rate in California in 2012 was 10.3 percent, whereas in 
Arizona it was 4.54 percent. See Nick Kasprak, Monday Map: Top State Marginal Income Tax 
Rates, as of January 1st, 2012, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/monday-map-top-state-marginal-income-tax-rates-january-1st-
2012. 
 306. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Fred. T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and 
Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 49 (2006) (arguing 
that tax credits are more equitable and efficient than deductions and exemptions); see also ORG. 
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX POLICY STUDY NO. 13, FUNDAMENTAL REFORM OF 
PERSONAL INCOME TAX 62 (2006) (noting that in many countries, conversion to refundable or 
“non-wastable” credits has been motivated by the concern of equitable treatment for taxpayers 
with no taxable income). 
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the federal deduction for state and local income taxes (SALT).307 One 
effect of the SALT deduction is that it encourages states to impose 
income taxes, or to prefer income taxes to property, sales, and other 
taxes that are not federally deductable.308 Commentators have had a 
hard time understanding why the federal government would be 
interested in subsidizing state-level income taxation.309 But the subsidy 
makes more sense once we account for tax-base conformity because 
through conformity, states bolster federal policies implemented 
through the federal income tax. This post hoc justification for the 
SALT deduction, although not without its problems,310 seems more 
persuasive than previously advanced justifications.311 
3. Legislative Sunsets.  Whether federal-state tax-base conformity 
strengthens or weakens the argument for federal legislative sunsets 
depends on how those sunsets operate in practice. The federal 
government has long employed expiration dates in tax legislation, but 
it has only recently engaged in the controversial practice of using 
sunsets to expire significant tax laws with large revenue effects.312 For 
 
 307. See I.R.C. § 164(a) (2006) (providing deductions for, inter alia, state and local real 
property, personal property, and income taxes).  
 308. See Martin S. Feldstein & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Effect of Federal Tax Deductibility on 
State and Local Taxes and Spending, 95 J. POL. ECON. 710, 731 (1987) (arguing that the SALT 
deduction provides an incentive for state governments to rely more heavily on federally 
deductible taxes than on other sources of revenue); Kaplow, supra note 2, at 486 (noting that 
because of the state and local tax deduction, “taxpayers will favor higher taxes (or be less 
aggressive in demanding lower taxes)”). 
 309. For example, Professor Kaplow notes that the notion that the SALT deduction is 
needed to compensate states for interjurisdictional spillovers is unsatisfying because the 
deduction is not limited to taxes that fund state programs with interjurisdictional spillovers. See 
Kaplow, supra note 2, at 480–84. 
 310. In addition to subsidizing conforming state tax provisions, the SALT deduction also 
subsidizes deviating provisions. Thus, the SALT deduction does not discriminate between state 
tax laws that bolster federal tax policies and those that do not. Indeed, in addition to subsidizing 
state (and local) income taxes, the SALT deduction subsidizes, inter alia, state and local real 
and personal property taxes. I.R.C. § 164(a) (2006). Taxpayers can also elect to deduct state and 
local sales taxes in lieu of income taxes. Id. § 164(b)(5). State and local real property, personal 
property, and sales tax bases do not derive from the federal government; thus, the federal 
deduction for them cannot be explained by the theory that those taxes bolster other federal tax 
incentives.  
 311. In addition to Kaplow’s criticism of the spillover argument, see supra note 309, 
justifications of the SALT deduction based on equity have also been criticized, see, e.g., Galle, 
supra note 2, at 807–15 (summarizing criticisms of equity justifications proffered for the SALT 
deduction).  
 312. For analysis of sunsetting legislation, compare George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect 
Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 237–39 (2009), 
which argues that legislative sunsets promote fiscal responsibility by reflecting the true costs of 
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example, Congress enacted some of the largest tax cuts in U.S. history 
during the Bush administration, and those tax cuts were originally set 
to expire at the end of 2010.313 If our growing experience with sunsets 
reveals that the application of clear expiration dates tends to coalesce 
legislative changes into a particular year (that is, the year when tax 
legislation is set to expire), and that sunsets thereby lead to greater 
predictability and stability in the federal tax law, then sunsets would 
make tax-base conformity easier for the states, in part by giving states 
advance notice of federal legislative changes.314 States with dynamic 
incorporation of federal law would face fewer revenue shocks 
because sudden changes in federal tax law would be less frequent and 
more predictable, and state legislators could be better prepared for 
them. Likewise, if sunsets lead to greater stability in the federal tax 
law, states with static or lagged incorporation would see less 
divergence over time between the state tax base and the federal tax 
base. Minimization of such divergence would help maintain the 
administrative and compliance cost savings of base conformity. In 
contrast, if as a practical matter sunsets lead to greater uncertainty 
about the content of federal tax law or to more substantive changes in 
the federal tax law, then sunsets would increase the costs of tax-base 
conformity.315 Our growing experience with sunsets will help answer 
these questions. 
 
legislation, with Kysar, supra note 252, at 1014, which argues that sunsets do not enhance fiscal 
responsibility but do increase rent-seeking and the influence of interest groups.  
 313. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 107, 
303, 117 Stat. 752, 755–56, 764 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)) 
(providing a December 31, 2010 sunset); Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (codified as amended at 
I.R.C. § 1 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)) (same); see also Kysar, supra note 252, at 1017 (noting the 
size of these tax cuts). Most of these tax cuts were extended in 2010 and again at the end of 
2012. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 101(a), 124 Stat. 3296, 3298 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1 (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2011)) (extending for two years the sunset of Section 901 of EGTRRA); see also 
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, §§ 101–102 (2013) (making 
permanent the tax cuts for most taxpayers, while letting rates revert for some taxpayers). 
 314. See Yin, supra note 312, at 232–33 (acknowledging the high rate of change in the 
federal tax law but arguing that by extending sunsetting legislation before its expiration date, 
Congress could “provide considerable stability and predictability”). But see Kysar, supra note 
252, at 1063–65 (arguing that sunsets lead to more legislative volatility).  
 315. The temporary repeal of the federal estate tax provides a recent example. In 2001, as 
part of the EGTRRA, Congress enacted legislation that phased out and then completely 
repealed the federal estate tax. EGTRRA §§ 501, 901(a), 115 Stat. at 69, 150 (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 2210 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). EGTRRA also gradually eliminated the 
federal credit for state-level estate taxes. The impact on the states of the elimination of this 
credit depended on how their estate taxes were structured. For states that had autonomous 
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4. Consumption Taxes.  As discussed in Part II, tax-base 
conformity generates significant administrative, legislative, and 
judicial cost savings. Indeed, the ease of collecting revenue on a base 
largely determined, administered, and enforced by the federal 
government may have led many states to adopt income taxes in the 
first place.316 If the federal government adopted a value-added tax or 
any other broad-based consumption tax, the administrative 
advantages of state conformity with federal consumption taxation 
might lead states to abandon their own consumption taxes in favor of 
federal conformity. By (mostly) refraining from assessing 
consumption taxes, the federal government preserves this base for the 
states, thereby ensuring that states have a platform for autonomous 
tax policymaking. The notion that a federal consumption tax would 
erode state tax autonomy probably does not constitute a decisive 
factor in the debate over whether the federal government should 
introduce a broad-based consumption tax. However, the potential 
impact of federal consumption taxes on state tax autonomy helps 
explain state opposition to federal consumption taxation.317 
 
estate taxes, elimination of the federal credit meant that state residents suddenly felt the 
economic burden of the state estate tax. For states that designed their estate taxes simply to 
“pick up,” or “soak-up,” the federal estate tax credit, the gradual elimination of the federal 
credit also automatically eliminated state-level estate taxes. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, 
supra note 8, ¶ 21.01[2] (Supp. 2002). Even though EGTRRA changes were phased in over 
time, only a few states amended their estate taxes to account for the federal changes. See 
Duncan & Luna, supra note 47, at 667–69. This response could signal that the amount of 
revenue from state-level estate taxes was not worth its administrative costs to the states, or that 
states were waiting to see whether the federal credit for state-level estate taxes would return at 
the end of 2010 when EGTRRA was set to expire. At the expiration of EGTRRA in 2010, 
Congress reinstated the federal estate tax for two years, but it provided only a deduction, rather 
than a credit, for state estate taxes. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 21.01[2] 
(Supp. 2002) (discussing state tax consequences of the federal legislation). As a result, for states 
with “soak-up” estate taxes, the state-level estate tax was not automatically reinstated when the 
federal estate tax was reinstated. 
 316. Stark, supra note 1, at 432. 
 317. See, e.g., Kathryn James, An Examination of Convergence and Resistance in Global Tax 
Reform Trends, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 475, 484 (2010) (“Each [value-added tax] 
reform proposal from Nixon to Bush Junior has met with a similar chorus of opposition: 
. . . state and local government representatives were concerned about the balance of federal 
taxing power and feared any intrusion into the sales tax area . . . .”). The states also have 
revenue concerns about the federal government intruding upon a base previously tapped 
exclusively by the states and localities. 
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C. Avenues for Future Research 
This Article’s introduction to the problems posed by the 
pervasive practice of federal-state tax-base conformity suggests 
directions for future empirical study. So far empirical research on tax-
base conformity and deviation has been “sparse,”318 and it has mostly 
focused on corporate taxation.319 There exists little empirical research 
on individual state taxation, and what little research there is tends to 
analyze differences among states’ effective tax rates, or the impact of 
federal tax rates on state tax rates, rather than analyzing differences 
in tax bases.320 But the analysis in this Article suggests that studying 
state tax bases would enrich our understanding of state taxation. 
For example, if federal tax laws function as sticky defaults, in 
part because of state legislators’ concerns about yardstick competition 
or signaling, then deviation by a pioneer state could pave the way for 
deviations by other states. Likewise, researchers should be able to 
observe other patterns in deviations from federal tax law, particularly 
among neighboring states that compete for residents. Interestingly, 
except for Iowa, the states that tax income but do not expressly 
incorporate a federal definition of income—states I have referred to 
as facially nonconforming—fall into two contiguous regions.321 This 
contiguity raises the question of whether competition for residents 
among neighbors drives nonconformity.322 Likewise, the federal tax 
law may contain regional biases due to the voting rules in Congress. 
Because each state has two senators, regardless of its population, 
sparsely populated states possess influence in Congress 
disproportionate to their populations.323 As a result, populous states 
 
 318. Luna & Watts, supra note 230, at 624.  
 319. See, e.g., Gravelle & Gravelle, supra note 291; Hildreth et al., supra note 46; Luna & 
Watts, supra note 230. 
 320. See, e.g., Esteller-Moré & Solé-Ollé, supra note 300, at 257 (estimating the effect of 
increases of federal personal tax rates on state tax rates but ignoring issues of base deviation by 
assuming a hypothetical common base). 
 321. The facially nonconforming states are Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Mississippi, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania. See supra note 39. 
 322. Pennsylvania and New Jersey share a border, and Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi 
form another continuous region of facial nonconformity.  
 323. See Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons from the 
Spending Power, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 495, 528–29 (2009) (noting that although the population of 
California is 32.3 times that of Rhode Island, its ability to form winning coalitions in Congress is 
only 5.5 times greater). Professor Baker argues that “allocation of coalition-building power in 
the Senate will importantly affect the distribution of special legislation—‘pork’—that Congress 
enacts under the Spending Clause.” Id. at 530. She confirms this hypothesis with empirical 
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may have more reason to decouple from certain federal tax laws than 
do sparsely populated states. Populous states also tend to have more 
resources and larger tax bureaucracies; these resources facilitate 
deviation. 
Patterns of state conformity and deviation also may reflect 
differences in state politics and political processes. For example, if 
states deviate from federal tax law when state preferences fail to 
match national preferences, then we would expect to see more 
deviations from the federal base when different political parties 
control the state and federal governments.324 Likewise, if states’ ability 
to respond quickly to changes in federal law affects their choice of 
method of incorporation of federal law (whether dynamic or static, 
AGI or taxable income), then methods of incorporation should vary 
with characteristics of state legislatures. For example, state 
legislatures that meet only biennially, or that have significant 
limitations on their ability to pass tax legislation, may be more likely 
to incorporate federal tax law statically.325 More generally, empirical 
research could be expected to reveal links between a state’s degree of 
conformity with the federal tax base and its other attributes, such as 
its overall income levels, demography, geography, climate, and 
culture. 
In addition to empirical research on patterns of state deviation 
and conformity, reliable estimates of the costs of deviation also would 
 
evidence of each state’s “balance of payments,” that is, its contributions to the federal fisc 
compared to federal outlays it receives. See id. at 534–36. This effect presumably would also 
carry over to tax expenditures, as well as other tax provisions. For example, the federal 
alternative minimum tax (which itself disproportionately disadvantages taxpayers in populous 
states) takes away the federal deduction for the payment of state and local taxes, a deduction 
for which taxpayers in populous states are disproportionately eligible. See I.R.C. § 
56(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (denying SALT deductions under the alternative minimum tax). 
  Differences in the extent to which state and federal legislative processes are subject to 
counter-majoritarian pressures—from, for example, misapportionment or gerrymandering—
could also result in federal preferences that diverge from state preferences. In such cases, one 
would predict a higher incidence of state deviation. 
 324. See, e.g., Morrow & Ricketts, supra note 174, at 28 (finding for corporate taxes “that 
the political affiliation of the state legislature, but not that of the majority of the state’s voters 
(as exhibited by the support of those voters for the president) is a significant predictor of the 
likelihood the state will conform to income-decreasing tax changes implemented at the federal 
level”). 
 325. See RONALD K. SNELL, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE 
EXPERIENCES WITH ANNUAL AND BIENNIAL BUDGETING 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/BiennialBudgeting_May2011.pdf (noting that nineteen 
states employ biennial budgeting); id. (noting that four states hold legislative sessions biennially, 
rather than annually).  
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help elucidate the degree of entrenchment of federal law. Although 
researchers have estimated overall state tax-compliance costs for 
multistate corporations, they have not estimated state tax-compliance 
costs for individuals or the cost savings for any taxpayers of state 
conformity to the federal tax base.326 Without a clear measure of these 
amounts, and without estimates of the incremental costs for deviating 
from particular provisions, it is hard for states and state voters to 
evaluate when their state could benefit from deviating from a 
particular federal tax provision. Thus, more empirical evidence could 
help quantify the costs and benefits of tax-base conformity, thereby 
aiding states in determining whether, and to what extent, they should 
conform to the federal base. 
CONCLUSION 
It has long been understood that by conforming to the federal tax 
base, states conserve legislative resources and take advantage of 
federal tax enforcement measures and other administrative benefits, 
such as tax information sharing. This Article offers new insights into 
the advantages of tax-base conformity: in addition to reducing 
administrative costs, base conformity also facilitates interstate 
commerce, reduces tax arbitrage, promotes interstate spillovers, and 
discourages discriminatory state taxation. Moreover, because it 
results in the states using very similar tax bases, conformity may 
productively channel tax competition to competition over tax rates, 
rather than tax bases. 
But tax-base conformity comes at a price. By homogenizing tax 
bases across the states, base conformity undermines both horizontal 
competition between the states and vertical competition between the 
states and the federal government. A consequence of this 
homogenization is that state tax bases may fail to reflect differences in 
the values and preferences of voters of different states. Moreover, 
when states use the federal tax base as the starting point for assessing 
state income taxes, they inevitably incorporate federal regulatory 
policy into their own tax bases. By delegating tax authority to the 
federal government in this way, states relinquish control over an 
important policy tool. Thus, the impact of tax-base conformity is 
 
 326. See Duncan & Luna, supra note 47, at 667 (observing the lack of empirical studies on 
the compliance cost savings due to base conformity). 
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similar to other intergovernmental interactions, such as conditional 
grants, that raise federalism concerns. 
Of course, there are crucial differences between federal-state 
tax-base conformity and conditional grants. First, states have greater 
freedom to deviate from particular federal tax provisions than from 
particular provisions of conditional federal grants. However, as this 
Article argues, because tax-base deviations impose costs and because 
not all federal tax provisions come à la carte, it is reasonable to 
assume that incorporating states adopt at least some federal tax laws 
that serve neither state interests nor state voter preferences. The 
federal government’s accomplishment of ever more regulation 
through the tax system exacerbates this problem. Another difference 
between tax-base conformity and conditional grants is that the 
pressure states feel to conform their tax bases to that of the federal 
government does not emanate primarily from the federal 
government. Instead, it derives from the need to compete with other 
states for mobile residents who want to minimize their compliance 
burdens. Likewise, states feel pressure to raise income taxes at the 
lowest possible administrative and legislative cost. 
The pressures to conform, and the benefits conformity brings, 
suggest that federal-state tax-base conformity is here to stay. The 
growth and persistence of base conformity reveals that the federal 
government has far more influence on state taxes than is usually 
acknowledged. Although scholars have long neglected tax-base 
conformity, this Article shows that to fully understand our fiscal 
federalism requires consideration of base conformity. 
 
